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CHAPTER1
Outline
This dissertation consists of two parts. Part I deals with labor market responses
to the Great Recession (Chapters 2 and 3). Part II deals with the effects of
monetary unification on macroeconomic stability (Chapters 4 and 5).
Part I
Starting in 2008/2009, the world economy experienced the most severe reces-
sion since the Great Depression 80 years before. As a result of this so-called
Great Recession, unemployment rates rose sharply around the world and—as
of this writing—are still elevated way above their pre-crisis levels in a number
of countries. However, the response of unemployment rates and other labor
market indicators to the Great Recession differed markedly across countries,
especially in Europe. Part I of this dissertation contributes to understanding
the reasons for this heterogeneity of labor market responses. Chapter 2 focuses
on three labor market institutions: Firing costs, short-time work, and the wage
formation process. Chapter 3 focuses on one of the most surprising labor mar-
ket responses to the Great Recession, namely the exceptional performance of
the German labor market, which became known as the “German labor market
miracle.” The methodological focus of Part I is predominantly empirical.
Chapter 2
This chapter analyzes the role of three labor market institutions in explaining
the heterogeneous labor market responses across Europe to the Great Recession,
namely the level of firing costs, the existence of short-time work, and the wage
formation process. It combines two different perspectives, a structural dynamic
model perspective and an empirical cross-country perspective. First, a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with microfounded labor market
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frictions is used to simulate the effects of the three labor market institutions
during a recession. Second, the predictions of the model are compared to the
actual outcomes from selected EU countries.
The main findings are the following: First, in line with the theoretical model,
countries with higher firing costs experienced a smaller reduction of employment
in response to the Great Recession. In this sense, firing costs can act as a shock
absorber. However, the theoretical model suggests that firing costs also delay
the subsequent recovery, i.e., it takes more time for employment to return to
its pre-crisis level. Second, in line with the theoretical model, countries with
important short-time working schemes experienced a larger reduction in output,
but a smaller reduction of employment. And third, countries with a smaller
increase in unit labor costs (i.e., wage moderation) prior to the Great Recession
experienced a smaller reduction of employment during the Great Recession.
Such a wage-moderation scenario was especially relevant for the German labor
market. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jens Boysen-Hogrefe, Wolfgang
Lechthaler, and Christian Merkl published under the title “The role of labor
market institutions in the Great Recession” in Applied Economics Quarterly
56(61), Supplement, pp. 65-88, June 2010. My contribution to this paper
consisted of the entire empirical analysis, from collecting the data to writing
the corresponding text passages.
Chapter 3
This chapter lays out the various reasons for the exceptional performance of
the German labor market during and after the Great Recession. The reference
point of the analysis is provided by an empirical labor market model of both
total hours worked and employment. Dynamic simulations of the crisis period
are conducted to assess how surprising the reaction of the labor market was.
The main findings are the following: The most important precondition for
the minor reaction of employment in response to the Great Recession was the
pronounced wage moderation observed in the years before, which constitutes a
distinct difference to all other recessions in Germany. Beyond that, the flexi-
bility of adjusting working time, which had increased considerably in the ten
years before, facilitated labor hoarding. In contrast, short-time work plays a
minor role in explaining the difference from previous recessions, since this in-
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strument has long been available to firms in Germany and its use has not been
extraordinary compared with earlier recessions.
This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jens Boysen-Hogrefe published
under the title “The German labour market miracle” in National Institute Eco-
nomic Review 214, pp. R38-R50, October 2010. I authored most of this paper,
including the survey on short-time work in Germany, the estimation of the
empirical labor market model, and the exposition of the wage-moderation and
internal-flexibility arguments. My co-author’s contribution consisted mainly of
the two subsections labeled “International perspective”, respectively.
Part II
The Great Recession not only affected labor markets, it also revealed deeper
economic problems in several countries within the European Monetary Union.
Questions were raised whether these countries would be better off leaving the
monetary union, thereby restoring their monetary independence and regaining
the possibility of devaluing their currencies. The loss of monetary independence
with its negative consequences for macroeconomic stability has long been con-
sidered one of the main costs associated with monetary unification. Part II of
this dissertation revisits this traditional argument of the Optimum Currency
Area (OCA) theory. Chapter 4 focuses on a benefit of monetary unification
that has the potential to overcompensate the loss of monetary independence,
but which has not been acknowledged by OCA theory so far. Chapter 5 focuses
on the important role of monetary policy for whether countries benefit from
monetary unification. The methodological focus of both chapters is exclusively
theoretical. The results are derived from New Keynesian DSGE models. These
models have two advantages in the OCA context. First, a welfare loss function
derived from the utility of households provides a well-defined welfare measure
to assess the costs and benefits of monetary unification. Second, this welfare
measure depends directly on the degree of macroeconomic stability, which in
turn depends on the international monetary regime. Thus, the main cost asso-
ciated with monetary unification—the loss of monetary independence—can be
evaluated explicitly.
3
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Chapter 4
This chapter uses a standard two-country New Keynesian DSGE model to an-
alyze the conditions under which countries benefit from forming a monetary
union. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, monetary policy is not assumed
to be conducted optimally, but instead follows Taylor-type interest rate rules.
The main findings are the following: When prices are relatively sticky, coun-
tries gain in welfare by forming a monetary union. The gain in welfare comes
from higher inflation stability, which outweighs the costs of higher output-gap
and terms-of-trade-gap instability. Two effects are responsible for this higher
inflation stability. First, the stabilizing property of a flexible nominal exchange
rate declines as prices become stickier. Second, fixing the nominal exchange rate
entails the inherent benefit of stabilizing inflation expectations. This inherent
benefit of a monetary union has not been acknowledged by OCA theory so far.
This chapter is based on my single-authored paper “Monetary union and
macroeconomic stabilization” published as Kiel Working Paper 1881, Kiel In-
stitute for the World Economy, November 2013.
Chapter 5
This chapter elaborates on Chapter 4, but it uses a more general version of
the two-country New Keynesian DSGE model. This model allows, among other
things, for trade imbalances, deviations from purchasing power parity (i.e., real
exchange rate fluctuations), and more variation in the conduct of monetary
policy.
The main findings are the following: Monetary policy is one of the most
important OCA criteria. That is, whether countries benefit from forming a
monetary union depends critically on the way monetary policy is conducted.
When countries are unable or unwilling to implement monetary policy opti-
mally, for whatever reason, they are likely to benefit from forming a monetary
union. This is mainly because monetary policy determines whether and to what
extent a flexible nominal exchange rate fosters or hampers macroeconomic sta-
bilization, even if monetary policy does not target the nominal exchange rate
explicitly.
This chapter is based on my single-authored paper “Monetary policy as an
optimum currency area criterion” published as Kiel Working Paper 1969, Kiel
Institute for the World Economy, November 2014.
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CHAPTER2
The Role of Labor Market Institutions
in the Great Recession
Abstract
The recent Great Recession had very heterogeneous effects on the la-
bor market outcomes in industrialized countries. We analyze the role
of three labor market institutions in this context, namely the level of
firing costs, the existence of short-time work and the wage formation
process. This paper combines two different perspectives, a structural
dynamic model perspective and an empirical cross-country perspective.
Using the Lechthaler, Merkl, and Snower (2010) model, we first simulate
the effects of the three labor market institutions during a recession. Us-
ing the panel of the EU-15 countries without Luxembourg, we then test
the predictions of the model. Indeed, we find evidence that the three
labor market institutions can partially explain the different labor market
reactions across countries during the Great Recession. However, further
empirical research is needed, as more data can be expected to become
available, especially with respect to the use of short-time work in differ-
ent countries.
Keywords: Employment; firing costs; short-time work; unit labor costs.
JEL classification: E24, E32, J64.
This paper was joint work with Jens Boysen-Hogrefe, Wolfgang Lechthaler,
and Christian Merkl and published under the title “The role of labor
market institutions in the Great Recession” in Applied Economics Quar-
terly, volume 56, issue 61, Supplement, pp. 65-88, June 2010, Duncker
& Humblot, Berlin.
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The German Labor Market Miracle
Abstract
This paper lays out the various reasons for the exceptional performance
of the German labor market during and after the Great Recession of
2008/2009. The reference point of our analysis is provided by an em-
pirical model of both total hours worked and employment. We conduct
dynamic simulations of the crisis period to assess how surprising the re-
action of the labor market really was. We argue that the most important
precondition for the minor reaction of employment during this crisis was
the pronounced wage moderation observed in the years before, which
constitutes a distinct difference to all other recessions in Germany. Be-
yond that, the flexibility of adjusting working time, which has increased
considerably during the past ten years, facilitated a tendency to labor
hoarding. In contrast, short-time work plays a minor role in explaining
the difference from previous recessions, since this instrument has always
been available to firms in Germany and its use has not been extraordi-
nary compared with earlier recessions.
Keywords: Labor market; Great Recession; employment; wage modera-
tion; short-time work.
JEL classification: E24, E37, J23, J30.
This paper was joint work with Jens Boysen-Hogrefe and published un-
der the title “The German labour market miracle” in National Institute
Economic Review, volume 214, pp. R38-R50, October 2010, SAGE Pub-
lications, London.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0027950110389760.
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CHAPTER4
Monetary Union and Macroeconomic
Stabilization
Abstract
It is conventionally held that countries are worse off by forming a mone-
tary union when it comes to macroeconomic stabilization. However, this
conventional view relies on assuming that monetary policy is conducted
optimally. Relaxing the assumption of optimal monetary policy not only
uncovers that countries do benefit from forming a monetary union un-
der fairly general conditions. More importantly, it also reveals that a
monetary union entails the inherent benefit of stabilizing private-sector
expectations about future inflation. As a result, inflation rates are more
stable in a monetary union.
Keywords: Monetary union; macroeconomic stabilization; welfare analy-
sis; history dependence; inflation expectations.
JEL classification: F33, F41, E52.
This paper was published under the title “Monetary union and macroe-
conomic stabilization” as Kiel Working Paper 1881, Kiel Institute for the
World Economy, Kiel.
http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/~
monetary-union-and-macroeconomic-stabilization/~
KWP_1881_revised.pdf.
For an earlier version, see “When do countries benefit from forming a
monetary union?” Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpoli-
tik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalenWirtschaft-
sordnung - Session: Monetary Policy II, No. B01-V2.
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/79787.
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4.1. Introduction
When do countries benefit from forming a monetary union? This question is
at least as old as the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) literature initiated by
Mundell (1961). One of the key insights of this literature is that for asymmetric
countries to benefit from forming a monetary union, prices and wages have to
be flexible and production factors have to be mobile. More recently, the New
Keynesian literature, by using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models, has come to the consensus that, from the perspective of macroeconomic
stabilization, forming a monetary union makes countries generally worse off in
terms of welfare.1 This is because countries relinquish one of their most impor-
tant policy instruments for macroeconomic stabilization, namely the short-term
nominal interest rate controlled by their national central bank.
However, this consensus is based on the assumption that the central bank con-
ducts monetary policy optimally. While constituting a very useful theoretical
benchmark from a normative perspective, the assumption of optimal monetary
policy entails at least two important disadvantages in the OCA context. On
the one hand, it is widely acknowledged that optimal monetary policy typically
involves severe practical limitations, in particular very demanding information
requirements. For example, the central bank needs to be able to observe the
households’ welfare function or the flexible-price equilibrium of the economy,
i.e., the equilibrium that would prevail under completely flexible prices.2 On
the other hand, the assumption of optimal monetary policy precludes the possi-
bility to assess if and how the welfare performance of a monetary union depends
on the way monetary policy is conducted, since deviations from optimality are
ruled out by assumption. Thus, it seems at least debatable whether optimal
monetary policy is the best modeling choice when one wants to know the con-
ditions under which countries benefit from forming a monetary union.3
In light of these two disadvantages, I take a different approach in this pa-
per by assuming that monetary policy follows Taylor-type interest rate rules,
according to which it responds only to observable variables, such as inflation
1See surveys by Corsetti (2008), Dellas and Tavlas (2009), and Beetsma and Giuliodori
(2010).
2For more practical shortcomings of optimal monetary policy, see Gali (2008, Ch. 4.3.2).
3In my view, this doubt is supported by Adao, Correia, and Teles (2009), who conclude
that “every currency area is an optimal currency area,” after having shown that the exchange
rate regime is irrelevant for stabilization policy if optimal monetary policy is complemented
by optimal fiscal policy.
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or output. By being able to vary the coefficients that determine the response
of monetary policy to changes in the respective variables, these interest rate
rules are general enough to allow for a great flexibility in specifying the be-
havior of monetary policy. For example, how aggressive is monetary policy in
its response to inflation? Does it respond to output? If so, how strongly? Or
does monetary policy smooth interest rates and to what extent? In this sense,
the way monetary policy is conducted can be viewed just as any other country
characteristic, such as its size or the degree of price stickiness in its economy.
It is then possible to assess if and how the welfare performance of a monetary
union depends on the behavior of monetary policy—something that is not pos-
sible under the assumption of optimal monetary policy. As it turns out, the
behavior of monetary policy is absolutely critical for the welfare performance
of a monetary union.
Given this different approach, the main finding of this paper is as follows:
In the standard two-country New Keynesian DSGE model, in which monetary
policy follows interest rate rules, countries may gain in welfare by forming a
monetary union. The gain in welfare comes from a higher stability of inflation
rates, which outweighs the costs of higher output-gap and terms-of-trade-gap
instability. Whether countries gain in welfare depends strongly on the degree
of price stickiness. When prices are relatively sticky, countries are better off
forming a monetary union; when prices are relatively flexible, countries are
better off maintaining a flexible exchange rate.
Two effects are responsible for this higher stability of inflation rates. First,
the benefit of maintaining a flexible exchange rate diminishes as prices become
stickier, since the nominal exchange rate inherits the stickiness of goods prices.
As a result, an increasing degree of price stickiness reduces the effectiveness
of the nominal exchange rate as a stabilization mechanism. Second, forming a
monetary union entails an inherent benefit.4 Since the nominal exchange rate
is fixed, the terms of trade and, therefore, the inflation rates display an inertial
or history-dependent behavior. This history dependence has the advantage of
affecting the inflation expectations of price setters in such a way as to lower
the responsiveness of inflation to changing economic conditions. The higher the
degree of price stickiness is, the stronger this effect is. As a result, inflation
rates are more stable in a monetary union.
4“Inherent” refers to the fact that the benefit is not modeled explicitly, like a reduction
in transaction costs, but emerges from within the model.
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This second effect corresponds to an effect that is well-known from the anal-
ysis of optimal monetary policy in a closed economy. There, optimal monetary
policy under discretion is inferior to optimal monetary policy under commit-
ment because the former does not influence the inflation expectations of price
setters in a favorable way. It suffers from the so-called stabilization bias. In
contrast, optimal monetary policy under commitment induces history depen-
dence into the economy and, therefore, exploits the fact that price setters are
forward-looking. The intuition in this paper is completely analogous. Form-
ing a monetary union may be superior to maintaining a flexible exchange rate
because fixing the exchange rate induces history dependence.
This benefit, which manifests itself in a higher stability of inflation rates
and which is related to the stabilization bias, obtains in addition to the ben-
efit of eliminating a potential inflation bias, which is stressed by Alesina and
Barro (2002) and Cooley and Quadrini (2003).5 Whereas the latter benefit has
been acknowledged in the literature (e.g., Dellas and Tavlas, 2009; Beetsma and
Giuliodori, 2010), the former still seems to be unknown.
It is important to realize that both effects described above are endogenous to
the model. The first effect is due to the presence of the uncovered interest parity
condition on the one hand and monetary policy following Taylor-type interest
rate rules on the other hand.6 The second effect is due to the fact that price
setters are forward-looking in the presence of nominal price rigidities. All these
features belong to the core of new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
models and, therefore, are present also in many medium-to-large-scale models
that are built around this core.7
Clearly, the finding that countries benefit from forming a monetary union
when prices are relatively sticky but not when prices are relatively flexible stands
in contrast to the predictions of the traditional OCA theory. Probably the most
important reason for this discrepancy is the fact that expectations are treated
as endogenous in New Keynesian models, unlike in the theoretical framework of
the traditional OCA literature, in which expectations are treated as exogenous.
Since the inherent benefit of monetary unions works through expectations, this
5Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)’s “advantage of tying one’s hands” follows the same logic,
although they refer to the former European Monetary System (1979–1999).
6Notably, the uncovered interest parity condition need not hold exactly for this effect to
exist. It suffices for the interest rates and the nominal exchange rate to be linked.
7The introduction of nominal price rigidities in the spirit of Calvo (1983) into NOEM
models goes back to Kollmann (2001), Gali and Monacelli (2005), and Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2002).
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channel is naturally missing in models without such an expectational feedback
mechanism.8
Another important finding of this paper is that whether forming a mone-
tary union is beneficial or not depends heavily on the way monetary policy is
conducted. When monetary policy responds to inflation aggressively or when it
implements a high degree of interest rate smoothing, then maintaining a flexible
exchange rate is superior. Generally, it is the quality of monetary policy that
is crucial for the welfare ranking between the monetary union and the flexible
exchange rate regime. Since monetary policy is more potent under the flexible
exchange rate regime, it is also more harmful when not conducted properly.
This is because the effects of monetary policy are reinforced by the nominal ex-
change rate. In this sense, a monetary union provides a protective mechanism
against monetary policy mistakes.
This paper is related along several dimensions to the New Keynesian litera-
ture that analyzes the conditions under which countries benefit from forming a
monetary union. In this literature, only a few studies have considered an en-
vironment without optimal monetary policy: Dellas and Tavlas (2005), Dellas
(2006), and Ferreira-Lopes (2010). The models used in these studies, as well as
their findings are, on the one hand, quite diverse. On the other hand, none of
these studies addresses the inherent benefit of monetary unions, the role of the
degree of price stickiness, nor the closely related issue of the inherited stickiness
of the exchange rate, all of which are crucial for the welfare ranking between
the monetary union and the flexible exchange rate regime.
Several studies have introduced explicit benefits of monetary unions to create
a counterpart to the cost of giving up national monetary policy as a stabiliza-
tion device. Such explicit benefits of monetary unions include the elimination of
shocks to the uncovered interest parity condition (Kollmann, 2004), the gain in
potential output (Ca’Zorzi, De Santis, and Zampolli, 2005), the gain in central
bank credibility (Clerc, Dellas, and Loisel, 2011), and the possibility of higher
consumption risk sharing across countries (Ching and Devereux, 2003). In con-
trast, no explicit benefits are introduced into the model employed in this paper.
The benefit of stabilizing inflation expectations is inherent to monetary unions
as a result of a fixed nominal exchange rate.
8See King (1993) for a critical assessment of the Old Keynesian, IS-LM models with
respect to their treatment of expectations.
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This paper is also related to Monacelli (2004).9 Among other things, he finds
that in a small open economy a fixed exchange rate regime induces inertia into
the economy. On the one hand, I show that this benefit carries over to a two-
country environment and is inherent to monetary union regimes as well.10 On
the other hand, I show that it does not hinge upon the stationarity of the price
level, as stressed by Monacelli (2004). Stationarity of the price level is a special
feature of the small open economy environment and does not carry over to a
two-country setting employed here. Also, Monacelli (2004) does not address
the role of the degree of price stickiness nor the related issue of the inherited
stickiness of the exchange rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines briefly
the structure of the model. Section 4.3 provides important analytical results
in the case of symmetric countries and presents the welfare results graphically.
Section 4.4 presents the results in the case of asymmetric countries. Section 4.5
relates the results to the traditional OCA theory. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2. Model
The model I use is a completely standard two-country New Keynesian DSGE
model. Thus, I keep the description very brief. It features two international
monetary regimes:
1. A monetary union (MU) regime: Both countries share the same currency.
A common monetary policy governs the common nominal interest rate.
2. A flexible exchange rate (FX) regime: Each country maintains its national
currency and conducts its own, independent monetary policy. Nominal
interest rates are country-specific. The nominal exchange rate between
the two currencies is flexible.
9For a small open economy, a fixed exchange rate regime may dominate a flexible exchange
rate regime with optimal monetary policy under discretion. A flexible exchange rate regime
with optimal monetary policy under commitment, however, always dominates the other two
regimes. Comparing the same three regimes, Soffritti and Zanetti (2008) come to a different
conclusion, namely that a fixed exchange rate regime fares worse than the two flexible ex-
change rate regimes. One possible explanation for the different finding could be the different
weight attached to the output-gap variance relative to the weight attached to the inflation
variance in the welfare loss function, which is ad hoc in both studies. Another explanation
could be the different assumption about whether the rest of the world is also subject to shocks
or not.
10In general, fixed exchange rate regimes and monetary union regimes do not coincide.
This depends on how the fixed exchange rate regime is implemented.
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The model is described in detail in Benigno (2004) and in Benigno and Be-
nigno (2008) and it includes a microfounded, quadratic welfare measure. Under
both regimes, the model economy features two countries with trade in con-
sumption goods (as opposed to trade in intermediate goods). Consumption
preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas type and are, in addition, identical across
countries, i.e., there is no home bias in consumption. These preferences imply
that risk sharing is perfect in the sense that consumption is equal across coun-
tries at all times. Purchasing power parity holds, i.e., the real exchange rate is
constant. While these assumptions are clearly restrictive, they greatly simplify
the analysis, and relaxing them to allow for a home bias in consumption (i.e.,
deviations from purchasing power parity and a variable real exchange rate) does
not alter the findings significantly. The only factor of production is labor, which
is immobile between countries. The only rigidity is the nominal price rigidity
in the spirit of Calvo (1983).
Under the FX regime, prices are set in the currency of the producer’s country
(“producer currency pricing”), i.e., the producer does not discriminate the price
between countries. The nominal exchange rate converts the price into foreign
currency, i.e., the law of one price holds and exchange rate pass-through is
complete. Given the same consumption preferences as under the MU regime,
purchasing power parity holds as well.
In both regimes, monetary policy is conducted via Taylor-type interest rate
rules. Importantly, I assume that monetary policy is not able to observe the
flexible-price equilibrium of the economy, in particular the flexible-price interest
rate and flexible-price output. Thus, monetary policy reacts to inflation and
to output (deviation from the steady state), not to the output gap (deviation
from flexible-price output). The only shocks considered are country-specific
productivity shocks. However, the findings are robust with respect to other
shocks, such as government-spending shocks or cost-push shocks.11
4.2.1. Model equations
The equations of the complete log-linearized model are displayed below (for the
full derivation, see Appendices B.1 and B.2). Deviations of the logarithm of a
variable Xt from its steady state are denoted by X˜t under flexible prices and
11In fact, under cost-push shocks the case for a monetary union becomes even stronger.
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by Xˆt under sticky prices.12 Variables and parameters are defined in Tables 4.1
and 4.2, respectively.
Table 4.1.: Variables
Ct Consumption (identical across countries)
Y it Output of country i = H,F
YWt World output (weighted average of country-specific output)
piit Producer price inflation in country i = H,F
piWt World inflation (weighted average of country-specific inflation)
piRt Inflation differential between the two countries piFt − piHt
Rit Nominal interest rate in country i = H,F
Rt Nominal interest rate in monetary union
Tt Terms of trade
St Nominal exchange rate
Y
i
t Productivity shock in country i = H,F
νit White noise process in country i = H,F
Table 4.2.: Parameters
ρ Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
n Country size measured by population
β Discount factor
η Inverse of elasticity of producing the differentiated good
σ Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods
αi Probability of not being able to reset the price in country i = H,F
φpi Inflation coefficient in interest rate rule
φY Output coefficient in interest rate rule
φR Interest rate smoothing coefficient in interest rate rule
ρi Persistence of productivity shock in country i = H,F
kiC k
i
C =
(1−αiβ)(1−αi)
αi
ρ+η
1+ση
kiT k
i
T =
(1−αiβ)(1−αi)
αi
1+η
1+ση
12Notation is adopted from Benigno (2004).
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Flexible-price equilibrium under both regimes
Under completely flexible prices, the model equations are identical for both the
FX and MU regime and are given by
C˜t =
η
ρ+ ηY
W
t (4.2.1)
T˜t = − η1 + ηY
R
t (4.2.2)
Y˜ Wt =
η
ρ+ ηY
W
t (4.2.3)
Y
W
t = nY
H
t + (1− n)Y Ft (4.2.4)
Y
R
t = Y
F
t − Y Ht (4.2.5)
Y
i
t = ρiY
i
t−1 + νit , (4.2.6)
for i = H,F .
Sticky-price equilibrium under the MU regime
Under sticky prices, the model equations for the MU regime are given by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(Rˆt − EtpiWt+1) (4.2.7)
Yˆ Ht = (1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt (4.2.8)
Yˆ Ft = −nTˆt + Cˆt (4.2.9)
piHt = (1− n)kHT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kHC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiHt+1 (4.2.10)
piFt = −nkFT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kFC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiFt+1 (4.2.11)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piFt − piHt (4.2.12)
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiWt + φY Yˆ Wt ) (4.2.13)
piWt = npiHt + (1− n)piFt (4.2.14)
Yˆ Wt = nYˆ Ht + (1− n)Yˆ Ft . (4.2.15)
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Sticky-price equilibrium under the FX regime
The model equations for the FX regime are given by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(
n(RˆHt − EtpiHt+1) + (1− n)(RˆFt − EtpiFt+1)
)
(4.2.16)
Yˆ Ht = (1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt (4.2.17)
Yˆ Ft = −nTˆt + Cˆt (4.2.18)
piHt = (1− n)kHT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kHC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiHt+1 (4.2.19)
piFt = −nkFT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kFC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiFt+1 (4.2.20)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piFt − piHt + ∆Sˆt (4.2.21)
Et∆Sˆt+1 = RˆHt − RˆFt (4.2.22)
RˆHt = φRRˆHt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiHt + φY Yˆ Ht ) (4.2.23)
RˆFt = φRRˆFt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiFt + φY Yˆ Ft ). (4.2.24)
4.2.2. Model description
Consumption is equal across countries at all times and is described by only one
Euler equation, equation (4.2.7) under the MU regime and equation (4.2.16)
under the FX regime. The only difference between the two Euler equations
is that under the MU regime the nominal interest rate is common to both
countries. The structure of aggregate demand is the same under both regimes
and given by equations (4.2.8), (4.2.9), (4.2.17), and (4.2.18). Also, the country-
specific New Keynesian Phillips curves are the same under both regimes and
are given by (4.2.10), (4.2.11), (4.2.19), and (4.2.20). In contrast to a closed-
economy framework, not only the consumption gap but also the terms-of-trade
gap (difference between sticky-price and flexible-price terms of trade) matters
for producer price inflation.13 The terms-of-trade identity is given by (4.2.12)
under the MU regime and by (4.2.21) under the FX regime, the difference
between the two being the presence of the nominal exchange rate in the latter.
Equation (4.2.22) is the uncovered interest parity condition. The expected
change in the nominal exchange rate corresponds to the interest rate differential
across countries. Finally, monetary policy is conducted via Taylor-type interest
13Note that the consumption gap is equal to the world output gap: Cˆt − C˜t = YˆWt − Y˜Wt .
Accordingly, the New Keynesian Phillips curves can be expressed in terms of the world output
gap as well.
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rate rules, given by equation (4.2.13) under the MU regime and by equations
(4.2.23) and (4.2.24) under the FX regime.
Under flexible prices, prices are set as a markup over marginal costs, monetary
policy is neutral, and consumption, output, and the terms of trade are driven
by productivity shocks only, given by equations (4.2.1), (4.2.2), and (4.2.3).
Since money is neutral under flexible prices, the international monetary regime
does not affect real variables, which therefore behave identically under both
monetary regimes.
4.2.3. Welfare loss function
The welfare analysis follows the logic of the familiar linear-quadratic approach,
according to which the log-linear model equations are used to evaluate a quadratic
welfare loss measure (Woodford, 2003). The world welfare loss function is given
by the discounted value of a weighted average across countries of the average
utility flow of agents using a second-order Taylor series expansion.14 Through-
out the paper, it is assumed that the distortion induced by monopolistic com-
petition is completely offset by an appropriate subsidy (see Appendix B.3 for
the full derivation). Thus,
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(Cˆt − C˜t) + (1 + η)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση)n α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ) varpi
H
t
+ σ(1 + ση)(1− n) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ) varpi
F
t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (4.2.25)
As in the closed economy, the welfare loss depends on the inflation rate and
the consumption gap.15 In the open economy, the welfare loss depends addi-
tionally on the terms-of-trade gap. Intuitively, when the terms of trade deviate
from the terms of trade that would prevail under flexible prices, the resulting al-
14Computing country-specific welfare would complicate the calculations significantly be-
cause more accurate approximations of the non-linear model equations would be necessary
(Benigno and Woodford, 2005). This is beyond the scope of this paper.
15In the basic closed-economy framework, consumption usually equals output. Note also
that the welfare loss function (4.2.25) can be expressed alternatively in terms of the world
output gap or the country-specific output gaps (see equation B.129). The specification in
terms of the consumption gap was chosen for analytical convenience.
19
Chapter 4. Monetary Union and Macroeconomic Stabilization
location of production across countries is inefficient due to the presence of price
stickiness. The weights in front of each component of the welfare loss function
are functions of the deep parameters of the model. The term t.i.p. contains
all the terms that are independent of monetary policy and the international
monetary regime in place. The term O(‖ξ‖3) contains third and higher order
terms, which can be neglected as long as the model equations are log-linear,
i.e., first-order approximations to the non-linear equilibrium conditions.
In the special case when prices are equally rigid in both countries (αH =
αF = α), the welfare loss function simplifies to
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(Cˆt − C˜t) + (1 + η)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση) α(1− α)(1− αβ)
[
varpiWt + n(1− n) var piRt
])
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (4.2.26)
4.2.4. Calibration
The values for the baseline calibration are taken from Benigno (2004), except
for the interest rate rule coefficients (Table 4.3). A value of 0.99 for the discount
factor β implies a steady-state real interest rate of around 4.1 percent annually.
A value of 7.66 for the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods σ
implies a steady-state markup of prices over marginal costs of 15 percent. A
value of 0.75 for the probability of not being able to reset the price αi implies
an average duration of price contracts of 4 quarters. Following Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998) and Benigno (2004), the inverse of the elasticity of producing
the differentiated good η is calculated as
η = wy − ρ+ 1− γ
γ
, (4.2.27)
where wy denotes the elasticity of the average real wage with respect to pro-
duction and γ denotes the labor income share.
Under the baseline calibration, monetary policy responds to inflation (φpi =
1.5), but it does not react to output (φY = 0) and does not engage in interest
rate smoothing (φR = 0). I assume throughout the paper that all interest rate
rule coefficients are identical across countries and regimes.
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Table 4.3.: Baseline calibration
ρ 1/6 Inv. of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
n 0.5 Country size measured by population
β 0.99 Discount factor
η 0.67 Inv. of elasticity of producing the differentiated good
wy 0.5 Production elasticity of average real wage
γ 0.75 Labor income share
σ 7.66 Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods
αi 0.75 Probability of not being able to reset the price
φpi 1.5 Inflation coefficient in interest rate rule
φY 0 Output coefficient in interest rate rule
φR 0 Interest rate smoothing coefficient in interest rate rule
ρi 0.9 Persistence of productivity shock
var νit 1 Variance of white noise process
corr(νHt , νFt ) 0 Correlation between country-specific white noise processes
I consider a broad range of values for the parameters of the model to check
for the validity of the results (Table 4.4). In particular, the interest rate rules
will also feature a reaction to output and interest rate smoothing.
Table 4.4.: Parameter range
ρ [0.1,1.1] Inv. of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
n [0.05,0.95] Country size measured by population
β [0.9,1.0] Discount factor
η [0.2,3.0] Inv. of elasticity of producing the differentiated good
wy [0.2,1.2] Production elasticity of average real wage
γ [0.5,0.9] Labor income share
σ [5,25] Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods
αi [0.05,0.95] Probability of not being able to reset the price
φpi [1.1,3.5] Inflation coefficient in interest rate rule
φY [0,3] Output coefficient in interest rate rule
φR [0,0.95] Interest rate smoothing coefficient in interest rate rule
4.3. Results under symmetry
First, I conduct the analysis under the assumption that the two countries are
symmetric (except for country size n). In particular, the degree of price sticki-
ness is equal across countries. The world welfare loss function under symmetry,
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equation (4.2.26), is repeated here for convenience:
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(Cˆt − C˜t) + (1 + η)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση) α(1− α)(1− αβ)
[
varpiWt + n(1− n) var piRt
])
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (4.3.1)
It contains four components: the variance of the consumption gap (Cˆt −
C˜t), the variance of the terms-of-trade gap (Tˆt − T˜t), the variance of the world
inflation rate (piWt ), and the variance of the inflation differential (piRt ).
4.3.1. Analytical results
The analytical results in this subsection are crucial to understanding the main
finding of the paper. I derive the recursive law of motion (RLOM) of the
model equations for each monetary regime using the method of undetermined
coefficients to obtain the analytical expressions for the variances contained in
the welfare loss function.16 The derivations are based on the assumption that
the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of productivity shocks are
identical across countries (αH = αF and ρH = ρF ) and that monetary policy
does not engage in interest rate smoothing (φR = 0).
Fortunately, it is not necessary to derive the RLOM for the variables con-
sumption and world inflation, since they both behave identically across mon-
etary regimes. To see this for the MU regime, eliminate the nominal interest
rate Rˆt in the Euler equation (4.2.7) by inserting the interest rate rule (4.2.13)
and the equations for aggregate demand (4.2.8) and (4.2.9):
ρEtCˆt+1 = (ρ+ φY )Cˆt + φpipiWt − EtpiWt+1. (4.3.2)
The same equation is obtained completely analogously for the FX regime.
For world inflation, inserting the New Keynesian Phillips curves, which are
identical across regimes, into the definition of world inflation piWt = npiHt + (1−
n)piFt , where αH = αF = α due to symmetry and therefore kHT = kFT = kT and
16Benigno and Benigno (2008) use a similar approach in describing the behavior of the
nominal exchange rate under different interest rate rules.
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kHC = kFC = kC , yields
piWt = kC(Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiWt+1. (4.3.3)
The reason why world inflation is the same under both the MU and the FX
regimes is that the terms of trade vanish from the equation when the degree
of price stickiness is equal across countries. The fact that both consumption
and world inflation behave identically across monetary regimes implies that the
variance of consumption and the variance of world inflation are identical as well.
As a result, they do not produce differences in welfare across the two regimes.
For the remaining two variables, the terms of trade and the inflation differ-
ential, the reduced system of equations under the MU regime is given by
piRt = −kT (Tˆt − T˜t) + βEtpiRt+1 (4.3.4)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piRt . (4.3.5)
The reduced system of equations under the FX regime is given by
piRt = −kT (Tˆt − T˜t) + βEtpiRt+1 (4.3.6)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piRt + ∆Sˆt (4.3.7)
Et∆Sˆt+1 = −φpipiRt + φY Tˆt. (4.3.8)
Equations (4.3.4) and (4.3.6) are obtained by subtracting the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve of country H from that of country F . Equations (4.3.5)
and (4.3.7) are the terms-of-trade identities. Equation (4.3.8) is obtained by
inserting the interest rate rules (4.2.23) and (4.2.24) and the equations for aggre-
gate demand (4.2.17) and (4.2.18) into the uncovered interest parity condition
(4.2.22).
The RLOM under the MU regime is, then, given by (see Appendix B.4 for
the entire derivation)
Tˆt = b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜t (4.3.9)
piRt = b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t, (4.3.10)
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with coefficients
b1 =
1 + kT + β −
√
(1 + kT + β)2 − 4β
2β
b2 =
1 + kT − β −
√
(1 + kT + β)2 − 4β
2β
c1 = c2 = c =
kT
1 + kT + β(1− ρH − b1) .
The RLOM under the FX regime is given by
Tˆt = b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜t (4.3.11)
piRt = b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t (4.3.12)
∆Sˆt = b3Tˆt−1 + c3T˜t, (4.3.13)
with coefficients
b1 = 0
b2 = 0
b3 = −1
c1 =
(φpi − ρH)kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH)
c2 =
(1− ρH + φY )kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH)
c3 =
(φpi − 1− φY )kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH) .
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Consequently, the variances of the terms-of-trade gap and the variances of
the inflation differential under each regime are given by
varMU(Tˆt − T˜t) =
[
(1 + ρHb1)c2
(1− b21)(1− ρHb1)
− 2c1− ρHb1 + 1
]
var T˜t (4.3.14)
varFX(Tˆt − T˜t) = (c1 − 1)2 var T˜t (4.3.15)
varMU piRt =
2c2(1− ρH)
(1 + b1)(1− ρHb1) var T˜t (4.3.16)
varFX piRt = c22 var T˜t (4.3.17)
var T˜t =
1
1− ρ2H
(
η
1 + η
)2 [
var νHt + var νFt − 2 cov(νHt , νFt )
]
.
(4.3.18)
Two important differences exist between the MU and FX regime. First, in
contrast to the MU regime, there is no persistence in the terms of trade nor in
the inflation differential under the FX regime (b1 = b2 = 0). Hence, once the
shock has vanished, both variables return immediately to their steady state.
This is due to the nominal exchange rate. Intuitively, the coefficient b3 = −1
implies that, if the terms of trade were, for example, one percent below the
steady state in the previous period, the nominal exchange rate would increase
by one percent in the current period, so that the terms of trade are at steady
state. Naturally, this mechanism is absent under the MU regime, since the
nominal exchange rate is fixed. Thus, both the terms of trade and the inflation
differential are inertial or history-dependent in the sense that they depend on
the realization of the terms of trade in the previous period. While the inertia
of the terms of trade in the context of a monetary union has been recognized
before (e.g., Benigno, 2004; Pappa, 2004), it was regarded solely as an additional
distortion in the economy. However, as will be shown below, the inertia of the
terms of trade will also prove to be beneficial, namely from the perspective of
stabilizing inflation expectations.
Second, in contrast to the MU regime, monetary policy is able to influence
the terms-of-trade gap and the inflation differential under the FX regime, i.e.,
monetary policy is more potent under the FX regime. Technically, the variance
of the terms-of-trade gap and of the inflation differential depend on the interest
rate rule coefficients φpi and φY . Moreover, if monetary policy is extremely
aggressive towards inflation under the FX regime (φpi →∞), the variance of the
terms-of-trade gap and of the inflation differential converge towards zero (since
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c1 → 1 and c2 → 0).17 Thus, the efficient equilibrium can be approximated
arbitrarily well, reducing the welfare loss to zero. In contrast, the variance of
the terms-of-trade gap and of the inflation differential under the MU regime
cannot be zero, and therefore the efficient equilibrium is not feasible. Thus,
only the FX regime features the so-called divine coincidence.18
4.3.2. Price stickiness
The analytical expressions for the variances can be used to derive the condition
under which world welfare is larger in one or the other monetary regime. Un-
fortunately, the resulting condition is a complex inequality that provides hardly
any intuition. In the following, I thus compute the welfare losses numerically
and display the results graphically. The deep parameters are calibrated accord-
ing to the baseline calibration (Table 4.3), except for the parameters of interest,
which take on a broad range of values (Table 4.4).
Whether the world welfare loss is higher in one than in the other monetary
regime depends crucially on the Calvo parameter α, i.e., the degree of price
stickiness in both economies (Figure 4.1). In both regimes, the world welfare
loss is increasing in the degree of price stickiness.19 When the degree of price
stickiness is rather low, the world welfare loss is higher under the MU regime
than under the FX regime. The countries are better off with their own currency
and their own independent monetary policy. However, beyond a certain thresh-
old (α ≈ 0.5), where the degree of price stickiness is rather high, the world
welfare loss is higher under the FX regime than under the MU regime. The
countries are better off forming a monetary union with one currency and one
common monetary authority. Quantitatively, the difference in welfare between
the two monetary regimes can be substantial. Under the baseline calibration,
the welfare loss under the MU regime is roughly 40 percent lower than under
the FX regime (0.8/1.3).
As described above, two components of the world welfare loss function (4.3.1)
behave identically across monetary regimes and, therefore, cannot create welfare
differences across regimes: the consumption gap and the world inflation rate
17Benigno and Benigno (2008) reach the same result for interest rate rules containing the
output gap (deviation from flexible-price output).
18See Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2011) for details on the divine coincidence in open
economies.
19This feature is common to the closed-economy setup of the basic New Keynesian model,
as in Gali (2008).
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Figure 4.1.: World welfare loss as a function of the degree of price stickiness
(αH = αF )
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(Figure 4.2, upper and lower left panel). However, this does not hold for the
terms-of-trade gap and the inflation differential (Figure 4.2, upper and lower
right panel). The contribution of the terms-of-trade gap to the world welfare
loss is higher under the MU regime than under the FX regime regardless of the
degree of price stickiness.20 This indicates that the MU regime entails costs.
However, the contribution of the terms-of-trade gap is much smaller than the
contribution of the inflation differential. This is due to the fact that agents
attach by far the highest weight to inflation, which is traditionally the case in
microfounded welfare measures derived from New Keynesian models. Therefore,
the inflation differential is the key to understanding the above finding that the
MU regime yields higher world welfare when prices are relatively sticky. In fact,
the pattern in the lower right panel of Figure 4.2 closely resembles the pattern
in Figure 4.1, with a similar threshold value of α ≈ 0.5. This indicates that the
MU regime entails benefits.
The contribution of a component to the world welfare loss is the product of
the variance of that component and its weight. The weight and variance of
the inflation differential show opposite patterns with respect to price stickiness.
20 This holds for the contribution of the country-specific output gaps as well. The corre-
sponding graphs are available upon request.
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Figure 4.2.: Contributions to world welfare loss in Figure 4.1
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Whereas the variance decreases with a rising degree of price stickiness (Figure
4.3), the weight increases (Figure 4.4). Thus, although the variance decreases
with the degree of price stickiness, which per se enhances the agents’ welfare,
the agents attach a higher weight to inflation as prices become stickier.21
Since the weight of the inflation differential is identical across the two mone-
tary regimes (this holds for all components), it is the variance that causes the
difference in welfare. Whereas the variance of the inflation differential is higher
under the MU regime for lower degrees of price stickiness, it is higher under
the FX regime for higher degrees of price stickiness. That is, inflation rates are
more stable under the MU regime when prices are relatively sticky.
The inflation differential in period t can be expressed as the sum of current
and discounted expected future terms-of-trade gaps. Solving equation (4.3.4)
forward, which holds under both regimes, gives
piRt = −kTEt
∞∑
k=0
βk(Tˆt+k − T˜t+k). (4.3.19)
Accordingly, current and expected future terms-of-trade gaps are the only de-
terminant for the current inflation differential. As shown next, two endogenous
21The agents attach a higher weight to inflation as prices become stickier because the
degree of inefficient price dispersion between differentiated goods is increasing in the degree
of price stickiness for a given level of aggregate inflation (Woodford, 2003).
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Figure 4.3.: Variances underlying the contributions in Figure 4.2
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Figure 4.4.: Weights underlying the contributions in Figure 4.2
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effects that both influence the terms-of-trade gap explain why inflation rates
are more stable under the MU regime when prices are relatively sticky. First,
the stabilizing property of a flexible nominal exchange rate declines as prices
become stickier (“inherited stickiness of the nominal exchange rate”). Second,
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fixing the exchange rate entails the benefit of affecting inflation expectations in
a favorable way by inducing history dependence into the economy (“inherent
benefit of monetary unions”).
Inherited stickiness of the nominal exchange rate
Whether the nominal exchange rate stabilizes or destabilizes the terms-of-trade
gap, thereby facilitating an efficient allocation across countries, depends on the
way monetary policy is conducted. Recall the recursive law of motion for the
nominal exchange rate, (4.3.13):
∆Sˆt = −Tˆt−1 + c3T˜t,
with
c3 =
(φpi − 1− φY )kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH) .
Under the baseline calibration, where monetary policy reacts to inflation,
but not to output (φY = 0), the coefficient c3 is unambiguously positive (since
φpi > 1) and smaller than one. Accordingly, in response to a shock that leads
to an increase in the flexible-price terms of trade, the nominal exchange rate
will increase as well, pushing up the sticky-price terms of trade closer to the
flexible-price terms of trade. Thus, the nominal exchange rate helps to stabilize
the terms-of-trade gap.
However, the stabilizing effect of the nominal exchange rate weakens as prices
become stickier. The size of the response of the nominal exchange rate to a
productivity shock decreases with the degree of price stickiness. Analytically,
as the degree of price stickiness α increases, kT decreases and c3 decreases. In
the limit, when prices are fixed (α→ 1), the nominal exchange rate is fixed as
well (kT → 0, c3 → 0).
The reason for this is that the expected change in the nominal exchange
rate depends on the interest rate differential across countries according to the
uncovered interest parity condition, (4.2.22):
Et∆Sˆt+1 = RˆHt − RˆFt .
Interest rates, in turn, are set by monetary policy in response to inflation accord-
ing to the interest rate rules. Therefore, an increase in price stickiness, which
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reduces inflation variability, reduces interest rate variability and, ultimately,
reduces the variability of the nominal exchange rate.
Thus, the nominal exchange rate inherits the stickiness of goods prices. This,
in turn, hampers the stabilization of the terms-of-trade gap. Therefore, the
stabilizing property of the nominal exchange rate of facilitating an efficient
allocation across countries declines with the degree of price stickiness. Notably,
for this effect to be effective, the uncovered interest parity condition need not
hold exactly. It suffices for the interest rates and the nominal exchange rate to
be linked.
Inherent benefit of monetary unions
The fact that the benefit of a flexible nominal exchange rate declines with the
degree of price stickiness cannot alone explain the finding that the MU regime is
welfare-improving over the FX regime. For even under relatively sticky prices,
the nominal exchange rate stabilizes the terms-of-trade gap at least to some
extent compared to a situation with a completely fixed nominal exchange rate,
as under the MU regime. This is also the reason why the variance of the terms-
of-trade gap is lower under the FX regime regardless of the degree of price
stickiness (Figure 4.3, upper right panel). Therefore, the MU regime must also
provide a benefit.
The MU regime differs from the FX regime in one important respect, as the
analytical results from Section 4.3.1 have shown. In contrast to the FX regime,
the economy under the MU regime is intrinsically inertial. So, even in the
presence of a one-off shock, the inflation differential and the terms-of-trade gap
are persistent. As shown next, this inertia will result in a higher stability of
inflation rates.
The qualitative difference between the two monetary regimes can be seen
clearly by looking at the impulse response of the terms-of-trade gap to a positive
one-off productivity shock in countryH (Figure 4.5).22 On impact, the terms-of-
trade gap decreases under both regimes because the sticky-price terms of trade
do not increase as much as the flexible-price terms of trade due to the stickiness
of prices. However, in the following period, when the shock has vanished, the
terms-of-trade gap has returned to the steady state under the FX regime, but
22The degree of price stickiness was set low (α = 0.2) to ensure that the differences in the
impulse responses are clearly visible. The differences are much smaller for higher degrees of
price stickiness, but they are qualitatively the same.
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not under the MU regime. Under the FX regime, it is the nominal exchange
rate that brings the terms-of-trade gap automatically back to the steady state
in the absence of shocks.23 Under the MU regime, this mechanism is absent,
since the nominal exchange rate is fixed. As a result, the terms-of-trade gap is
intrinsically inertial or history-dependent.
Figure 4.5.: Impulse response of the terms-of-trade gap to a positive one-off
productivity shock in country H (ρH = 0), with α = 0.2
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Importantly, the history dependence of the terms-of-trade gap manifests itself
in an overshooting pattern. The terms-of-trade gap overshoots because the
sticky-price terms of trade are still elevated above the steady state after the
shock has vanished, whereas the flexible-price terms of trade are back at the
steady state. In subsequent periods, the terms-of-trade gap converges back to
the steady state.
The qualitative difference in the dynamics between the two monetary regimes
prevails in situations in which the productivity shock itself is persistent (Figure
4.6, left panel).24 Whereas the terms-of-trade gap converges monotonically back
to the steady state under the FX regime, it overshoots the steady state under
the MU regime.
23Interestingly, this mechanism is independent of the interest rate rule coefficients φpi and
φY (recall the RLOM coefficient b3 = −1).
24The calibration underlying the impulse responses in Figure 4.6 is now identical to the
calibration underlying the welfare results in Figure 4.1 through 4.4.
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Since the inflation differential is determined by the terms-of-trade gap and its
expected future path (recall equation 4.3.19), it exhibits the same qualitative
difference. Accordingly, under the FX regime the inflation differential increases
on impact and converges monotonically back to the steady state (Figure 4.6,
right panel). In contrast, under the MU regime, price setters adjust their prices
less in the initial period despite the stronger initial change in the terms-of-trade
gap because they anticipate the future overshooting of the terms-of-trade gap.
In subsequent periods, inflation approaches the steady state faster than under
the FX regime and eventually overshoots the steady state as well.25 As a result,
the variance of the inflation differential, i.e., the sum of squared deviations of
the inflation differential from zero, is lower under the MU regime than under
the FX regime.
Figure 4.6.: Impulse responses to a positive productivity shock in country H
with ρH = 0.9 and α = 0.75
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To sum up: Since price setters are forward-looking, not only present, but
also expected future terms-of-trade gaps matter for current inflation. Since the
nominal exchange rate is fixed under the MU regime, the terms-of-trade gap
overshoots in response to a shock at some point in time, which would then call
for the opposite price adjustments as in the present. In anticipation of this,
current price responses are smaller in magnitude than under the FX regime.
As a result, inflation is more stable under the MU regime. Thus, the inherent
benefit of monetary union is that it affects inflation expectations in such a
way as to lower the welfare-relevant variance of inflation by inducing history
dependence into the economy. The strength of this benefit increases as prices
25Throughout the paper, I use the term “overshooting” to describe both “overshooting”
and “undershooting.”
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become stickier, since price setters attach higher weights to future terms-of-
trade gaps as the probability of being able to reset prices decreases.
The benefit of history dependence is well-known from the analysis of optimal
monetary policy in a closed-economy environment. Optimal monetary policy
under discretion is inferior from a welfare perspective to optimal policy under
commitment because the former does not influence the inflation expectations of
price setters in a favorable way. It suffers from the so-called stabilization bias.26
In contrast, optimal monetary policy under commitment induces history depen-
dence into the economy, therefore taking advantage of the fact that price setters
are forward-looking. This results in a higher stability of inflation. In exactly
the same sense, forming a monetary union may be superior to maintaining a
flexible exchange rate under certain conditions because fixing the nominal ex-
change rate affects inflation expectations in a favorable way by inducing history
dependence into the economy.
Notably, this benefit exists despite the fact that price levels are not station-
ary.27 Thus, and in contrast to Monacelli (2004), the benefit does not hinge
upon stationarity of price levels. This is a particular feature of the small-
open-economy assumption and does not generally carry over to a two-country
environment. Instead, the benefit hinges upon the overshooting pattern of the
terms of trade, the anticipation of which reduces the magnitude of price changes,
rendering the inflation rates more stable.
While the inertia of the terms of trade has been recognized before (e.g., Be-
nigno, 2004; Pappa, 2004), it was regarded solely as an additional distortion in
the economy, not as a benefit. The reason for this is the different assumption
on monetary policy. Given that there are as many policy instruments as distor-
tions under the FX regime but more distortions than policy instruments under
the MU regime, monetary policy is more potent under the FX regime.28 Under
the assumption that monetary policy is conducted optimally and is equipped
with the necessary information, as is the case in Pappa (2004), it is not sur-
prising that the FX regime is superior, since monetary policy has the ability
to implement the flexible-price allocation, achieving the first-best solution (di-
vine coincidence). While the beneficial effect of the inertial terms of trade is
26For details on the stabilization bias, see, e.g., Woodford (2003, Ch. 7), Gali (2008, Ch.
5), or Walsh (2010, Ch. 8).
27Impulse responses for price levels are available upon request.
28The fact that monetary policy is more potent under the FX regime is reminiscent of the
analytical results from Section 4.3.1.
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also present in these circumstances, it is dwarfed by an ideal monetary policy.
By contrast, when monetary policy is not able to be conducted optimally, e.g.,
due to the very demanding information requirements, and instead it resorts to
interest rate rules, as is the case in this paper, its abilities are more limited. In
these circumstances, the beneficial effect of the inertial terms of trade may be
strong enough as to render the MU regime superior.
The following section elaborates on the importance of monetary policy for
the welfare performance of the MU regime.
4.3.3. Monetary policy
The finding that forming a monetary union is beneficial when prices are rela-
tively sticky is very robust to the range of parameter values considered in Table
4.4.29 The important exception is the parameters that govern the behavior of
monetary policy, i.e., the coefficients of the interest rate rules. These will be
considered next. Critically, such an analysis, in which the welfare performance
of a monetary union regime is analyzed under different monetary policy designs,
is not possible under optimal monetary policy—an assumption often made in
the strand of the New Keynesian literature that deals with OCA issues—since
deviations from optimality are ruled out by assumption.
Response to inflation
Whether forming a monetary union turns out to be beneficial depends crucially
on the inflation coefficient φpi in the interest rate rules, i.e., on the aggressive-
ness of monetary policy towards inflation (Figure 4.7).30 Starting out at a very
low response of monetary policy to inflation (φpi above, but close to, one), the
MU regime yields a lower world welfare loss for every degree of price stickiness.
Increasing the aggressiveness of monetary policy a little bit results in the FX
regime being superior for very low degrees of price stickiness, but inferior for
higher degrees of price stickiness. As the aggressiveness of monetary policy in-
creases further, the threshold value for α increases beyond which the MU regime
yields a lower world welfare loss. Eventually, beyond a certain aggressiveness of
29The corresponding graphs are available upon request.
30The graph in the right panel of Figure 4.7 is a rotation of the graph in the left panel, in
order to be able to see behind the steep surface area. Cutting through the two surface areas
along φpi = 1.5 produces Figure 4.1.
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monetary policy towards inflation (φpi ≈ 2.5), the MU regime is inferior to the
FX regime regardless of the degree of price stickiness.
Figure 4.7.: World welfare loss as a function of the degree of price stickiness
(αH = αF ) and the inflation coefficient (φpi), from two different
angles
The intuition for this is as follows. Under the FX regime, when monetary
policy reacts to inflation only, the nominal exchange rate stabilizes the terms-
of-trade gap in response to shocks (see Section 4.3.2). The strength of this sta-
bilizing property increases with the aggressiveness of monetary policy towards
inflation, since monetary policy directly influences the nominal exchange rate
via the uncovered interest parity condition. As a result, even when prices are
relatively sticky, monetary policy can counteract by being more aggressive to-
wards inflation. In the limit (φpi →∞), monetary policy perfectly stabilizes all
welfare-relevant variables, reducing the welfare loss to zero (divine coincidence).
This is not the case under the MU regime because the common monetary policy
has no influence on the terms-of-trade gap and the inflation differential when
prices are equally sticky across countries (see Section 4.3.1).
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Response to output
The welfare ranking between the two monetary regimes depends also on the
output coefficient in the interest rate rules φY , i.e., on the aggressiveness of
monetary policy towards output (Figure 4.8). For almost all the combinations
of φY and φpi considered, the FX regime yields a higher world welfare loss than
the MU regime, although the degree of price stickiness was deliberately chosen
to favor the FX regime (α = 0.2). Increasing the degree of price stickiness
would favor the MU regime further. In general, the stronger monetary policy
reacts to output, the stronger it needs to react to inflation for the FX regime
to remain superior. This relationship is very steep; a small increase in φY (e.g.
from 0 to 0.25) requires a strong increase in φpi (from roughly 1.5 to 2.3).
Figure 4.8.: World welfare loss as a function of the output coefficient (φY ) and
the inflation coefficient (φpi), with α = 0.2, from two different
angles
Unlike in the case of the response to inflation, the more aggressive mone-
tary policy reacts to output, the smaller the impact response of the nominal
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exchange rate to shocks becomes (see coefficient c3 of the RLOM). When the
aggressiveness of monetary policy towards output relative to inflation exceeds
a certain degree (φY > φpi − 1), the nominal exchange rate destabilizes the
terms-of-trade gap in response to shocks (c3 < 0).
The reason for this is that from a welfare perspective, a response to output
by monetary policy is detrimental. It is not the deviation of output from the
steady state that is welfare-relevant, it is the deviation from the flexible-price
counterpart (output gap).31 For example, a positive productivity shock in coun-
try H induces an increase in output, but a decrease in the output gap, since
the increase in output is lower than the increase in flexible-price output. A
welfare-oriented reaction of monetary policy would require a reduction in the
interest rate due to the negative output gap. Instead, monetary policy raises
the interest rate due to the rise in output. As a result, the variance of the
inflation differential is higher when monetary policy reacts to output (φY > 0)
than when it does not react to output (φY = 0).32
While a reaction to output is detrimental under both regimes (in Figure 4.8,
the welfare loss is increasing in the output coefficient φY under both regimes),
the damage in terms of welfare is greater under the FX regime. The reason
for this is that, in contrast to the MU regime, monetary policy under the FX
regime affects every component of the welfare loss function (see Section 4.3.1).
Thus, conducting “bad” monetary policy is more harmful under the FX regime
because monetary policy is more potent in this regime. Essentially, the nominal
exchange rate does not compensate for monetary policy mistakes, it reinforces
them. In this sense, a monetary union provides a protective mechanism against
monetary policy mistakes.
Interest rate smoothing
The welfare ranking between the two monetary regimes depends on the degree
of interest rate smoothing φR as well (Figure 4.9).33 When monetary policy
does not engage in interest rate smoothing (φR = 0), the MU regime yields
a lower welfare loss for relatively sticky prices. As the degree of interest rate
smoothing increases, the threshold value for α beyond which the MU regime
31Recall that the welfare loss function can be expressed alternatively in terms of country-
specific output gaps instead of the consumption gap (see equation B.129).
32This is common to the closed-economy setup of the basic New Keynesian model, as in
Gali (2008).
33Cutting through the two surface areas along φR = 0 produces Figure 4.1
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is superior increases as well. For very high degrees of interest rate smoothing,
the MU regime is welfare-improving only for extremely high degrees of price
stickiness. Thus, interest rate smoothing makes a beneficial monetary union
less likely.
Figure 4.9.: World welfare loss as a function of the degree of price stickiness
(αH = αF ) and the interest rate smoothing coefficient (φR), from
two different angles
The reason for this becomes clear by looking again at the impulse response
of the terms-of-trade gap to a positive one-off productivity shock in country
H, but now with a relatively high degree of interest rate smoothing (Figure
4.10). The impulse response under the MU regime is identical to the situation
without interest rate smoothing (Figure 4.5) because monetary policy continues
to exert no influence on the terms of trade when prices are equally sticky across
countries. In contrast, the impulse response under the FX regime now resembles
the response under the MU regime. Although the productivity shock is one-off,
the terms-of-trade gap displays inertia in the form of overshooting.
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Figure 4.10.: Impulse response of the terms-of-trade gap to a positive one-off
productivity shock in country H (ρH = 0), with φR = 0.9 and
α = 0.2
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As a result, inflation expectations are affected in the same favorable way as
under the MU regime, namely by inducing history dependence into the econ-
omy. Only the source of history dependence is different. Under the FX regime,
monetary policy has to engage in interest rate smoothing to induce history de-
pendence. Under the MU regime, history dependence is induced automatically
by the fact that the nominal exchange rate is fixed. For the FX regime to be
welfare-improving over the MU regime under relatively sticky prices, monetary
policy has to implement a sufficiently high degree of interest rate smoothing.
This renders the inflation differential more stable under the FX regime.
The fact that interest rate smoothing under the FX regime reduces the welfare
loss by stabilizing inflation comes as no surprise. As shown by Woodford (1999),
one way for monetary policy to implement the kind of history dependence that
is desirable from the perspective of optimal monetary policy is to engage in
interest rate smoothing by including a feedback of the current nominal interest
rate to past realizations of the nominal interest rate, as is the case in the interest
rate rules given by equations (4.2.23) and (4.2.24).
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4.4. Results under asymmetry
In the following, I check whether asymmetries in country size or in the degree of
price stickiness matter for the welfare ranking between the MU and FX regime.
4.4.1. Country size
If the two countries differ only in population size, the analytical results from
Section 4.3.1 carry over. Accordingly, the RLOM under both monetary regimes,
equations (4.3.9) through (4.3.13), are valid in this case. As one can see, the
RLOMs are independent of the country size n. Thus, the welfare-relevant infla-
tion differential and the terms-of-trade gap are independent of n. As a conse-
quence, the threshold value for α beyond which the MU regime yields a lower
world welfare loss is completely insensitive with respect to n. Therefore, the
welfare ranking between the MU and FX regime does not depend on country
size.
4.4.2. Price stickiness
The world welfare loss function under different degrees of price stickiness across
the two countries is given by equation (4.2.25) and repeated here for conve-
nience:
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(Cˆt − C˜t) + (1 + η)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση)n α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ) varpi
H
t
+ σ(1 + ση)(1− n) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ) varpi
F
t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (4.4.1)
It contains four components: the variance of the consumption gap (Cˆt− C˜t),
the variance of the terms-of-trade gap (Tˆt − T˜t), the variance of inflation in
country H (piHt ), and the variance of inflation in country F (piFt ).
Unless the degree of price stickiness is extremely high (α ≥ 0.9, which cor-
responds to an average duration of price contracts of at least 10 quarters),
asymmetry in the degree of price stickiness does not matter for the welfare
ranking between the MU and FX regime (Figure 4.11). Drawing from the anal-
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ysis above, the intuition is the following. First, the inherent benefit of monetary
unions of inducing history dependence is independent of country characteristics.
It depends only on the fact that the nominal exchange rate is fixed and that
price setters are forward-looking. Second, the nominal exchange rate inherits
the stickiness of goods prices from both countries. It does not matter if the
stickiness is equally present in both countries or if the stickiness comes primar-
ily from one country. Thus, as long as the aggregate degree of price stickiness
in the world as a whole is sufficiently high, the MU regime continues to be
beneficial.
Figure 4.11.: World welfare loss as a function of the degree of price sticki-
ness in country H (αH) and country F (αF ), from two different
angles
4.5. Contrast to traditional OCA theory
This paper has shown that in the standard two-country New Keynesian DSGE
model, countries benefit from forming a monetary union when prices are rel-
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atively sticky but do not when prices are relatively flexible. This finding is
clearly at odds with Friedman (1953)’s case for flexible exchange rates and with
the traditional OCA theory.34 First, note that in the model employed in this
paper the need for macroeconomic adjustment is triggered by an asymmetric
temporary change in productivity, whereas the traditional OCA analysis usually
assumes a permanent shift in demand from the products of one country to the
products of the other.
Second, and more importantly, the role of expectations differs quite sub-
stantially between the New Keynesian and the Old Keynesian framework. In
the Old Keynesian framework, in which the key predictions of the traditional
OCA theory were developed, expectations of economic agents were treated as
exogenous. In contrast, in New Keynesian models private-sector expectations
are treated as endogenous. As shown, it is precisely the expectations channel
that renders inflation rates more stable under the monetary union regime. This
channel is naturally missing in models without such an expectational feedback
mechanism.35
4.6. Conclusion
The main finding of this paper is that in the basic two-country New Keynesian
DSGE model, in which monetary policy is conducted via Taylor-type inter-
est rate rules, forming a monetary union is welfare-improving when prices are
relatively sticky. In this case, the costs of higher output-gap and terms-of-trade-
gap instability are outweighed by the benefit of higher inflation stability. Two
endogenous effects are responsible for this. First, the stabilizing property of
a flexible nominal exchange rate declines as prices become stickier. Second,
fixing the exchange rate entails the inherent benefit that it stabilizes inflation
expectations by inducing inertia into the economy.
The paper has also shown that whether forming a monetary union is bene-
ficial or not depends heavily on the way monetary policy is conducted. When
monetary policy responds to inflation aggressively or when it implements a high
degree of interest rate smoothing, maintaining a flexible exchange rate is supe-
rior. In contrast, monetary policy mistakes (such as a reaction to output) are
34De Grauwe (2012) summarizes the key insights from the traditional OCA theory.
35See King (1993) for a critical assessment of the Old Keynesian, IS-LM models with
respect to their treatment of expectations.
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more harmful under a flexible exchange rate. In this sense, a monetary union
provides a protective mechanism against monetary policy mistakes.
These findings suggest that the conventional view of the costs and benefits of
forming a monetary union in terms of macroeconomic stabilization may need to
be revised, at least to the extent that real-world monetary policy is not optimal.
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B. Appendix
B.1. Monetary union regime
This appendix contains the full derivation of the model under the monetary
union regime. The world, which consists of two countries labeled H and F ,
is populated by a continuum of agents on the interval [0, 1]. The population
on the segment [0, n) lives in country H, the population on the segment [n, 1]
lives in country F . Thus, n measures the population size as a fraction of world
population. An agent is both consumer and producer. He produces a single
differentiated good and consumes all the goods produced in both countries.
Consumer problem
Agent j in country i = H,F derives positive utility from consumption Cj
and negative utility from producing the differentiated good yj. The present
discounted value of lifetime utility U j is given by36
U j = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(Cjt )− V (yjt , zit)
]
, (B.1)
where E denotes the expectations operator and β the discount factor.
V is an increasing, convex function of agent j’s supply of his product yjt and a
decreasing convex function of productivity zit, which is common to all agents in
country i. One can think of V as the combination of the agent’s disutility from
working and the production function. If the disutility from working is given by
g(N jt ), where N jt is the number of hours worked, and the production function
is given by yjt = f(N jt , zit), then V = g(f−1(y
j
t , z
i
t)).
U is an increasing, concave function of consumption Cjt . The agent consumes
both a bundle of differentiated goods from country H and from country F with
a preference structure of the Cobb-Douglas type, so that
Cjt =
CjH,t
n
n CjF,t
1− n
1−n , (B.2)
36In Benigno (2004), the agent derives utility also from holding money. However, money
in the utility function is not necessary if monetary policy is conducted via interest rates rules.
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where the bundles of differentiated goods are given by aggregators according to
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):
CjH,t =
[( 1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
0
cjt(h)
σ−1
σ dh
] σ
σ−1
(B.3)
CjF,t =
[( 1
1− n
) 1
σ
∫ 1
n
cjt(f)
σ−1
σ df
] σ
σ−1
.
These preferences imply (1) that the elasticity of substitution between differ-
entiated goods cjt from one country is σ, which is assumed to be greater than
one and equal across countries, (2) that the elasticity of substitution between
the bundles of goods from the two countries CH,t and CF,t is one and equal
across countries, and (3) that the share of the expenditures for a bundle of
goods from one country in the overall consumption expenditures of an agent
coincides with the country’s share in world population, i.e., there is no home
bias in consumption.
Accordingly, the aggregate price index in country i is given by
P it = (P iH,t)n(P iF,t)1−n, (B.4)
where the price indices for the bundles of differentiated goods in each country
are defined by
P iH,t =
[ 1
n
∫ n
0
pit(h)1−σdh
] 1
1−σ
(B.5)
P iF,t =
[ 1
1− n
∫ 1
n
pit(f)1−σdf
] 1
1−σ
.
In their role as producers, agents charge only one price for their good irre-
spective of whether the good remains in the country or is exported (no price
discrimination). Furthermore, exporting does not entail transportation costs.
These assumptions imply that a single good has the same price in both coun-
tries, i.e., pHt (h) = pFt (h) and pHt (f) = pFt (f). Given identical consumption
preferences across countries, this immediately leads purchasing power parity to
hold, so PHt = P Ft = Pt. Consequently, the superscript i can be dropped from
all the price indices.37
37Note that Pt can be interpreted as a consumer price index, PH,t and PF,t as producer
price indices.
46
Chapter 4. Monetary Union and Macroeconomic Stabilization
Agent j takes three decisions with respect to his consumption choices. First,
he decides on the overall level of consumption Cjt .38 Second, given Cjt the agent
optimally allocates expenditures between the bundles of differentiated goods
CjH,t and C
j
F,t by minimizing total expenditure PtC
j
t subject to (B.2). As a
result, demand for these bundles is given by
CjH,t = n
(
PH,t
Pt
)−1
Cjt , C
j
F,t = (1− n)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−1
Cjt . (B.6)
Third, given CjH,t and C
j
F,t the agent optimally allocates expenditures between
the differentiated goods by minimizing PH,tCjH,t and PF,tC
j
F,t subject to equa-
tions (B.3). This yields
cjt(h) =
1
n
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ
CjH,t, c
j
t(f) =
1
1− n
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ
CjF,t. (B.7)
Combining (B.6) and (B.7) yields
cjt(h) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ (
PH,t
Pt
)−1
Cjt , c
j
t(f) =
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ (
PF,t
Pt
)−1
Cjt . (B.8)
The terms of trade are defined from the perspective of country F , i.e., the
ratio of the price of the bundle of goods produced in country F to the price of
the bundle of goods imported from country H:
Tt =
PF,t
PH,t
. (B.9)
Equations (B.8) can then be expressed in terms of the terms of trade as
cjt(h) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ
T 1−nt C
j
t , c
j
t(f) =
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ
T−nt C
j
t , (B.10)
where the terms of trade were inserted by rearranging the aggregate price equa-
tion (B.4) and by using the definition of the terms of trade (B.9).
Aggregating over all agents living in both countries, world demand for the
differentiated goods can be written as
yt(h) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ
T 1−nt C
W
t , yt(f) =
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ
T−nt C
W
t , (B.11)
38As shown below, Cjt is determined by the usual Euler consumption equation (B.14).
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where world consumption is given by
CWt =
∫ 1
0
Cjt dj. (B.12)
There are two types of assets agents can trade in. Within each country,
agents can insure against all possible states of nature by holding a portfolio of
contingent, one-period securities whose real value (denominated in units of the
consumption-based price index) is denoted by Bi,jt and whose vector of prices
is denoted by qit. Across countries, agents can trade in a non-contingent, one-
period bond whose nominal value (denominated in the currency of the union)
is denoted by Bjt and whose nominal interest rate is denoted by Rt. Thus, asset
markets are incomplete across countries, but complete within countries. The
intertemporal budget constraint of agent j in country i is then given by
Cjt + qitB
i,j
t +
Bjt
Pt(1 +Rt)
= Bi,jt−1 +
Bjt−1
Pt
+ (1− τ i)pt(j)yt(j)
Pt
, (B.13)
The agent’s income stems also from sales revenues pt(j)yt(j) net of a propor-
tional, country-specific tax τ i.39
All contingent securities and non-contingent bonds are assumed to be in zero
supply in the initial period, so Bi,j0 = Bj0 = 0 for all i and j. Together with the
facts that agents have identical preferences and that asset markets are complete
within countries, this assumption implies perfect risk sharing of consumption
within each country. Therefore, it is possible to analyze the consumer problem
from the viewpoint of the representative agent of country H and country F .
The representative agent in country i maximizes his lifetime utility (B.1)
subject to the budget constraint (B.13). By combining the resulting first order
conditions with respect to consumption and bond holdings, the usual Euler
consumption equation is then given by
UC(Cit) = (1 +Rt)βEt
{
UC(Cit+1)
Pt
Pt+1
}
. (B.14)
One important implication of the Cobb-Douglas type consumption prefer-
ences given by (B.2) together with the initial condition BH0 = BF0 = 0 is that
risk sharing is perfect across countries as well despite incomplete asset markets
39The tax will turn out to be a subsidy to exactly offset the distortion caused by monop-
olistic competition.
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at the international level, in the sense that40
CHt = CFt = Ct. (B.15)
To gain intuition, first note that, similar to (B.3), aggregate output in the two
countries can be expressed as
Y Ht =
[( 1
n
) ∫ n
0
yt(h)
σ−1
σ dh
] σ
σ−1
(B.16)
Y Ft =
[( 1
1− n
) ∫ 1
n
yt(f)
σ−1
σ df
] σ
σ−1
.
Then, applying (B.16) to (B.11) and using (B.15) yields
Y Ht = T 1−nt Ct, Y Ft = T−nt Ct. (B.17)
Making use of the definition of the terms of trade (B.9) and the aggregate price
equation (B.4), this can be rearranged to
PH,tY
H
t = PtCt, PF,tY Ft = PtCt. (B.18)
Finally, the ratio of the two equations is given by
PF,t
PH,t
Y Ft
Y Ht
= Tt
Y Ft
Y Ht
= 1. (B.19)
Nominal output equals nominal consumption in both countries at all times,
as can be seen from (B.18). Thus, current accounts are always balanced. The
reason is that any variation in the terms of trade is accompanied by an exact
proportional variation in relative output across countries, as shown by (B.19).
Agents shift consumption from the good that has become relatively expensive
to the good that has become relatively cheap (expenditure switching effect) in
such a way that a one percent increase in the relative price (terms of trade)
leads to a one percent decrease in relative quantities. This is ultimately due to
the fact that the elasticity of substitution between the bundles of goods from
the two countries is one (Cobb-Douglas preferences).
As a result, relative nominal output and therefore relative income between
the two countries are constant at all times. Thus, there are no gains from asset
40For a proof, see Benigno (2003), Appendix A.
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trade across countries, and the internationally traded bond becomes redundant
(BHt = BFt = 0 ∀ t).41
Producer problem
In their role as producers, agents act in an environment of monopolistic com-
petition, in which they dispose of some degree of market power. Furthermore,
prices are sticky in the sense that the agent is able to change his price in a given
period with a fixed probability, as in Calvo (1983). The probability of being
able to change the price may differ across countries and is given by 1− αi.
Agent j in country i maximizes expected, discounted profits by choosing the
price p˜t(j) taking into account that demand depends on the chosen price and
that the price may remain unchanged for some periods. Formally, the agent
maximizes
Et
∞∑
k=0
(αiβ)k
[
λt+k(1− τ i)p˜t(j)y˜t,t+k(j)− V (y˜t,t+k(j), zit+k)
]
(B.20)
subject to the demand function
y˜t,t+k(h) =
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)−σ
T 1−nt+k Ct+k (B.21)
if the agent lives in country H or
y˜t,t+k(f) =
(
p˜t(f)
PF,t+k
)−σ
T−nt+kCt+k, (B.22)
if the agent lives in country F , where y˜t,t+k(j) denotes total demand of good j
at time t + k if the price p˜t(j) prevails. Profits are expressed in utility units.
Therefore, nominal sales revenues net of taxes (1−τ i)p˜t(j)y˜t,t+k(j) are converted
into utility units using the marginal utility of nominal revenues λt+k = UC(Ct+k)Pt+k ,
which is the same for all agents in both countries due to perfect risk sharing
41The result that, under Cobb-Douglas preferences, the terms of trade provide perfect
insurance against output variations was already shown by Cole and Obstfeld (1991). Note
that the result does not hinge upon the specification in which the expenditure share in the
Cobb-Douglas function coincides with the population size n (a feature also common to the
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) model). If the expenditure share does not coincide with the
population size, as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), relative consumption across countries as
well as relative income across countries are still constant over time. However, they are not
equal to one, as in (B.15) and (B.19) respectively. Consumption and nominal output, then,
differ across countries.
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within and across countries and due to purchasing power parity. The cost of
production expressed in utility units is given by the function V .
The first order condition yields the optimal price
p˜t(j) =
σ
(σ − 1)(1− τ i)
Et
∑∞
k=0(αiβ)kVy(y˜t,t+k(j), zit+k)y˜t,t+k(j)
Et
∑∞
k=0(αiβ)kλt+ky˜t,t+k(j)
, (B.23)
where Vy denotes the derivative of function V with respect to output y˜(j). All
agents that live in the same country and are able to reset their price in a certain
period will set the same price, since they share identical preferences (function
V ) and face the same demand curves, which depend only on aggregate variables
such as PH , PF , T , and C, and the common elasticity of substitution σ. Hence,
in a given period, a fraction 1 − αi of agents will set the same optimal price,
while for a fraction αi of agents the price from the previous period remains
effective:
PH,t = [αHP 1−σH,t−1 + (1− αH)p˜t(h)1−σ]
1
1−σ (B.24)
PF,t = [αFP 1−σF,t−1 + (1− αF )p˜t(f)1−σ]
1
1−σ .
When prices are flexible, the optimal price equation (B.23) for country H
simplifies to
T n−1t =
σ
(σ − 1)(1− τH)
Vy(yHt , zHt )
UC(Ct)
, (B.25)
and for country F to
T nt =
σ
(σ − 1)(1− τF )
Vy(yFt , zFt )
UC(Ct)
. (B.26)
Note that the closed-economy counterpart is given by
1 = σ(σ − 1)(1− τ)
Vy(yt, zt)
UC(Ct)
. (B.27)
Moreover, variations in the marginal disutility of production of one country
relative to the other country are reflected in variations in the terms of trade.
Dividing (B.26) by (B.25) yields
Tt =
1− τH
1− τF
Vy(yFt , zFt )
Vy(yHt , zHt )
. (B.28)
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Terms of trade
It is necessary to express the terms-of-trade equation (B.9) in changes, since the
model will only contain price changes (i.e., inflation) rather than price levels.
Thus
Tt
Tt−1
= PF,t
PF,t−1
PH,t−1
PH,t
. (B.29)
Log-linearization
In the following, the model equations will be log-linearized. Given a variable
Xt, the following definitions will be used:
XWt = nXHt + (1− n)XFt (B.30)
XRt = XFt −XHt (B.31)
Furthermore, deviations of the logarithm of a variable Xt from its steady state
are denoted by X˜t under flexible prices and by Xˆt under sticky prices.
Flexible-price equilibrium Under flexible prices, prices are set as a markup
over marginal costs, monetary policy is neutral, and consumption, output, and
the terms of trade are driven by productivity shocks only. Accordingly, con-
sumption, world output, and the terms of trade evolve as follows:42
C˜t =
η
ρ+ ηY
W
t (B.32)
T˜t = − η1 + ηY
R
t (B.33)
Y˜ Wt =
η
ρ+ ηY
W
t . (B.34)
The first equation is derived by log-linearizing (B.25) and (B.26) and taking the
weighted average with weight n. The second equation is derived by subtracting
the log-linear approximation of (B.25) from the log-linear approximation of
(B.26). The third equation is derived by inserting the first two equations into
the weighted average of the log-linear approximations of equations (B.17).
The following definitions were used:
ρ = −UCCC
UC
(B.35)
42In contrast to Benigno (2004), I abstract from fiscal policy shocks.
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denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion,
η = VyyC
Vy
(B.36)
denotes the inverse of the elasticity of producing the differentiated good, and
finally
Y
i
t = −
Vyz
VyyC
zˆit (B.37)
reparameterizes the productivity shock in country i.
The productivity shock in country i follows an AR(1) process of the form
Y
i
t = ρiY
i
t−1 + νit , (B.38)
where νit is a white noise process with var νit = 1.
Sticky-price equilibrium Under sticky prices, the system of equations is given
by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(Rˆt − EtpiWt+1) (B.39)
Yˆ Ht = (1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt (B.40)
Yˆ Ft = −nTˆt + Cˆt (B.41)
piHt = (1− n)kHT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kHC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiHt+1 (B.42)
piFt = −nkFT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kFC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiFt+1 (B.43)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piFt − piHt (B.44)
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiWt + φY Yˆ Wt ). (B.45)
Equation (B.39) is the log-linear approximation of the Euler consumption
equation (B.14), where Cit = Ct and pit = ln(Pt/Pt−1). Recall that, due to
perfect risk sharing, consumption is the same across countries, which implies
that there is only one Euler equation. Equations (B.40) and (B.41) are log-linear
approximations of the equations for aggregate demand (B.17).
Equations (B.42) and (B.43) represent the New Keynesian Phillips curves for
country H and country F respectively, where piHt = ln(PH,t/PH,t−1) and piFt =
ln(PF,t/PF,t−1). They are derived by combining the log-linear approximation of
the optimal price (B.23) with the log-linear approximation of (B.24) for each
country separately. The parameters in front of the terms-of-trade gap (Tˆt− T˜t)
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and the consumption gap (Cˆt − C˜t) are defined as follows (for i = H,F ):
kiC =
(1− αiβ)(1− αi)
αi
ρ+ η
1 + ση (B.46)
kiT =
(1− αiβ)(1− αi)
αi
1 + η
1 + ση (B.47)
Equation (B.44) is the log-linear approximation of the terms-of-trade equation
(B.29). Finally, equation (B.45) represents the Taylor-type interest rate rule,
according to which the common monetary policy reacts to union-wide inflation
and to union-wide output (measured as the weighted average of country-specific
inflation and output, respectively) with coefficients φpi and φY and engages in
interest rate smoothing with coefficient φR.
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B.2. Flexible exchange rate regime
The main difference to the MU regime, of course, is that both countries possess
their own currency and independent monetary policy. Notwithstanding, the
model structure is to a large extent identical. The behavior of output, con-
sumption, and the terms of trade under flexible prices is given by equations
(B.32) through (B.34).
Under sticky prices, the system of equations is given by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(
n(RˆHt − EtpiHt+1) + (1− n)(RˆFt − EtpiFt+1)
)
(B.48)
Yˆ Ht = (1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt (B.49)
Yˆ Ft = −nTˆt + Cˆt (B.50)
piHt = (1− n)kHT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kHC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiHt+1 (B.51)
piFt = −nkFT (Tˆt − T˜t) + kFC (Cˆt − C˜t) + βEtpiFt+1 (B.52)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piFt − piHt + ∆Sˆt (B.53)
Et∆Sˆt+1 = RˆHt − RˆFt (B.54)
RˆHt = φRRˆHt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiHt + φY Yˆ Ht ) (B.55)
RˆFt = φRRˆFt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiFt + φY Yˆ Ft ). (B.56)
Given the same assumptions as in the MU regime on the set of assets agents
can trade in, on the agents’ preferences, and on the law of one price, the result of
perfect risk sharing carries over to the FX regime.43 Therefore, consumption is
described by one Euler equation (B.48). In contrast to the MU regime, the Euler
equation contains two interest rates, since monetary policy is country-specific.
The equations for aggregate demand (B.49) and (B.50) as well as the New
Keynesian Phillips curves (B.51) and (B.52) are the same as under the MU
regime. Agents are assumed to set their price in the currency of their country
(producer currency pricing). The assumption of no price discrimination and
no transportation costs implies that the law of one price holds, which in turn
implies that exchange rate pass-through is complete. The law of one price
43See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001). By adopting the assumption from the MU regime that
asset markets are incomplete across countries I deviate from Benigno and Benigno (2008),
who assume asset markets across countries to be complete. With identical Cobb-Douglas
preferences, however, risk sharing is perfect regardless of whether asset markets are complete
or not.
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together with identical consumption preferences implies that purchasing power
parity holds as well.
The terms of trade are now given by
Tt =
StPF,t
PH,t
, (B.57)
where PH,t denotes the price of the bundle of differentiated goods produced in
country H denominated in country H’s currency, PF,t denotes the price of the
bundle of differentiated goods produced in country F denominated in coun-
try F ’s currency, and St is the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of
country F ’s currency in terms of country H’s currency. First-differencing and
log-linearizing the definition of the terms of trade yields (B.53).
Equation (B.54) represents the uncovered interest parity condition, which can
be obtained by subtracting the log-linearized Euler equation of country F from
the one of country H, using the fact that purchasing power parity holds. Thus,
the expected change in the nominal exchange rate corresponds to the interest
rate differential across countries. Finally, equations (B.55) and (B.56) represent
the Taylor-type interest rate rules, according to which monetary policy reacts
to country-specific inflation and output with coefficients φpi and φY and engages
in interest rate smoothing with coefficient φR.
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B.3. Welfare loss function
This appendix contains the full derivation of the world welfare loss function.
The world welfare loss function is the discounted value of a weighted average
across countries of the average utility flow of agents using a second-order Taylor
series expansion in the spirit of Woodford (2003).44
The average utility among agents in country H is given by
wHt = U(Ct)−
1
n
∫ n
0
V (yt(h), zHt )dh, (B.58)
and average utility among agents in country F is given by
wFt = U(Ct)−
1
1− n
∫ 1
1−n
V (yt(f), zFt )df. (B.59)
The discounted value of the weighted average of the two flows is then given by
W˜t = Et
∞∑
k=0
βk(nwHt+k + (1− n)wFt+k). (B.60)
Each term of the utility function is treated separately.
The term U(Ct)
Taking a second-order linear expansion of U(Ct) around the steady state value
C yields
U(Ct) = U(C) + UC(Ct − C) + 12UCC(Ct − C)
2 +O(‖ξ‖3), (B.61)
where the term O(‖ξ‖3) groups all the terms that are of third or higher order
in the deviations of the various variables from their steady state.
Furthermore, a second-order Taylor expansion to Ct yields
Ct − C
C
= Cˆt +
1
2Cˆ
2
t +O(‖ξ‖3)⇔ Ct − C = CCˆt +
1
2CCˆ
2
t +O(‖ξ‖3), (B.62)
where Cˆt = ln(Ct)− ln(C).
44The derivation follows Benigno (2003), Appendix D. Here, I do not abstract from exoge-
nous government expenditures. The loss function without government expenditure shocks is
identical.
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Inserting (B.62) into (B.61) yields
U(Ct) = U(C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p
+UC(CCˆt +
1
2CCˆ
2
t ) +
1
2UCC(CCˆt +
1
2CCˆ
2
t )2 +O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCCCˆt +
1
2UCCCˆ
2
t +
1
2UCC(C
2
Cˆ2t + C
2
Cˆ3t +
1
4C
2
Cˆ4t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O(‖ξ‖3)
) + t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCCCˆt +
1
2UCCCˆ
2
t +
1
2UCCC
2
Cˆ2t + t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCC
Cˆt + 12Cˆ2t + 12 UCCUC C︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−ρ
Cˆ2t
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCC
[
Cˆt +
1
2(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
]
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3), (B.63)
where the term t.i.p. collects all the terms that are independent of monetary
policy and independent of whether the two countries form a monetary union or
not.
The term 1
n
∫ n
0 V (yt(h), zHt )dh
A second-order Taylor expansion of the second term in (B.58) around a steady
state, where yt(h) = Y
H for all h and t, and where zHt = 0 for all t yields
V (yt(h), zHt ) = V (Y
H
, 0) + Vy
(
yt(h)− Y H
)
+ VzzHt +
1
2Vyy
(
yt(h)− Y H
)2
+ Vyz
(
yt(h)− Y H
)
zHt +
1
2Vzzz
H
t
2 +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.64)
World demand for a differentiated good produced in country H (including
demand from government expenditures GH) can be expressed by
y(h) =
(
p(h)
PH
)−σ [
T 1−nCW +GH
]
=
(
p(h)
PH
)−σ
T 1−nCW︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yd(h)
+
(
p(h)
PH
)−σ
GH︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yg(h)
= yd(h) + yg(h). (B.65)
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A second-order Taylor expansion to ydt (h) yields
ydt (h)− Y H = Y H yˆdt (h) +
1
2Y
H
yˆdt (h)2 +O(‖ξ‖3), (B.66)
where yˆdt (h) = ln(ydt (h))− ln(Y H).
A second-order Taylor expansion to ygt (h) yields
ygt (h) = Y
H
yˆgt (h) +
1
2Y
H
yˆgt (h)2 +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.67)
Combining (B.65), (B.66), and (B.67) gives
yt(h)− Y H = ydt (h) + ygt (h)− Y H
= Y H yˆdt (h) +
1
2Y
H
yˆdt (h)2 + Y
H
yˆgt (h) +
1
2Y
H
yˆgt (h)2
= Y H
(
yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 + yˆ
g
t (h) +
1
2 yˆ
g
t (h)2
)
. (B.68)
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Inserting into (B.64) and simplifying yields
V (yt(h), zHt ) =V (Y
H
, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p.
+VyY
H
yˆdt (h) + 12 yˆdt (h)2 + yˆgt (h) + 12 yˆgt (h)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p.

+ VzzHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p.
+12VyyY
H2
(
yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 + yˆ
g
t (h) +
1
2 yˆ
g
t (h)2
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yˆt(h)2+t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
+ VyzY
H
(
yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 + yˆ
g
t (h) +
1
2 yˆ
g
t (h)2
)
zHt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yˆdt (h)zHt +t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
+ 12Vzzz
H
t
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p.
+O(‖ξ‖3)
= VyY
H
(
yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2
)
+ 12VyyY
H2
yˆt(h)2 + VyzY
H
yˆdt (h)zHt
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= VyY
H
yˆdt (h) + 12 yˆdt (h)2 + 12 VyyVy Y H︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡η
yˆt(h)2 +
Vyz
Vy
yˆdt (h)zHt

+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= VyY
H
yˆ
d
t (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 +
η
2 yˆt(h)
2 + Vyy
Vy
Y
H
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=η
Vyzz
H
t
VyyY
H︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡−Y Ht
yˆdt (h)

+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= VyY
H
(
yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 +
η
2 yˆt(h)
2 − ηyˆdt (h)Y Ht
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.69)
Next, a relationship between Vy and UC will be derived. In the steady state,
equations (B.25) and (B.26) can be expressed as
(1− τH)UC(C) = σ
σ − 1T
1−n
Vy
(
T
1−n
C, 0
)
(B.70)
(1− τF )UC(C) = σ
σ − 1T
−n
Vy
(
T
−n
C, 0
)
, (B.71)
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which can be rearranged to
(1− ΦH)UC(C) = T 1−nVy
(
T
1−n
C, 0
)
(B.72)
(1− ΦF )UC(C) = T−nVy
(
T
−n
C, 0
)
(B.73)
with
(1− ΦH) = (1− τH)σ − 1
σ
(B.74)
(1− ΦF ) = (1− τF )σ − 1
σ
. (B.75)
The analysis must be restricted to the case in which distortions from the
efficient steady state are small, i.e., the deviations of ΦH and ΦF are at least
of order O(‖ξ‖). Furthermore, for reasons of tractability, it is assumed that
ΦH = ΦF . If τH = τF , it follows that T = 1 and Y H = Y F = C. Then,
equation (B.72) yields
(1− ΦH)UC(C) = T 1−nVy
(
T
1−n
C, 0
)
= Vy
(
Y
H
, 0
)
= Vy. (B.76)
Plugging into (B.69) yields
V (yt(h), zHt ) = (1− ΦH)UC(C)Y H
(
yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 +
η
2 yˆt(h)
2
− ηyˆdt (h)Y Ht
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.77)
With Y H = C and UC(C) = UC together with the small distortion assump-
tion, i.e., the product of ΦH with second-order terms can be neglected, the last
equation can be written as
V (yt(h), zHt ) = UCC
(
(1− ΦH)yˆdt (h) +
1
2 yˆ
d
t (h)2 +
η
2 yˆt(h)
2
− ηyˆdt (h)Y Ht
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.78)
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Integrating across agents belonging to country H yields
1
n
∫ n
0
V (yt(h), zHt )dh = UCC
(
(1− ΦH) 1
n
∫ n
0
yˆdt (h)dh+
1
2
1
n
∫ n
0
yˆdt (h)2dh
+ η2
1
n
∫ n
0
yˆt(h)2dh− η 1
n
∫ n
0
yˆdt (h)dhY
H
t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCC
(
(1− ΦH)Ehyˆdt (h) +
1
2Ehyˆ
d
t (h)2 +
η
2Ehyˆt(h)
2
− ηEhyˆdt (h)Y Ht
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.79)
Recall the basic relationship
var(X) = E(X2)− (E(X))2 ⇔ E(X2) = var(X) + (E(X))2. (B.80)
Thus,
1
n
∫ n
0
V (yt(h), zHt )dh = UCC
(
(1− ΦH)Ehyˆdt (h) +
1
2
(
varh yˆdt (h) + [Ehyˆdt (h)]2
)
+ η2
(
varh yˆt(h) + [Ehyˆt(h)]2
)
− ηEhyˆdt (h)Y Ht
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.81)
Expanding Y Ht
Recall the aggregator
Y Ht =
{ 1
n
∫ n
0
yt(h)
σ−1
σ dh
} σ
σ−1
. (B.82)
I conduct a second-order Taylor series expansion of both sides of the equation.
Note that the more general case of (B.62) is given by
Cat − Ca
C
a = aCˆt +
1
2a
2Cˆ2t +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.83)
Thus, approximating yt(h)
σ−1
σ up to second-order yields
yt(h)
σ−1
σ = Y H
σ−1
σ
[
1 + σ − 1
σ
yˆt(h) +
1
2
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
yˆt(h)2
]
+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.84)
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Inserting into (B.82) yields
Y Ht
σ−1
σ = 1
n
∫ n
0
Y
H
σ−1
σ
[
1 + σ − 1
σ
yˆt(h) +
1
2
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
yˆt(h)2
]
dh+O(‖ξ‖3)
= Y H
σ−1
σ
{
1
n
∫ n
0
1dh+ σ − 1
σ
1
n
∫ n
0
yˆt(h)dh+
1
2
(
σ − 1
σ
)2 1
n
∫ n
0
yˆt(h)2dh
}
+O(‖ξ‖3)
= Y H
σ−1
σ
{
1 + σ − 1
σ
Ehyˆt(h) +
1
2
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
Ehyˆt(h)2
}
+O(‖ξ‖3).
(B.85)
A second-order Taylor expansion to Y Ht
σ−1
σ yields
Y Ht
σ−1
σ = Y H
σ−1
σ
{
1 + σ − 1
σ
Yˆ Ht +
1
2
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
Yˆ H
2
t
}
+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.86)
Equating the previous two equations yields
Yˆ Ht +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
Yˆ H
2
t = Ehyˆt(h) +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
Ehyˆt(h)2 +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.87)
This expression raised to the power of two gives
Yˆ H
2
t = (Ehyˆt(h))2 +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.88)
Inserting back into (B.87) and simplifying yields
Yˆ Ht +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
(Ehyˆt(h))2 = Ehyˆt(h) +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
Ehyˆt(h)2 +O(‖ξ‖3)
Yˆ Ht = Ehyˆt(h) +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
[
Ehyˆt(h)2 − (Ehyˆt(h))2
]
+O(‖ξ‖3)
Yˆ Ht = Ehyˆt(h) +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆt(h) +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.89)
Analogously,
Yˆ H,dt = Ehyˆdt (h) +
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h) +O(‖ξ‖3). (B.90)
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Using the previous two equations to substitute out Ehyˆt(h) and Ehyˆdt (h) in
(B.81) gives
1
n
∫ n
0
V (yt(h), zHt )dh
= UCC
(
(1− ΦH)
[
Yˆ H,dt −
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h)
]
+ 12
(
varh yˆdt (h) +
[
Yˆ H,dt −
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h)
]2)
+ η2
(
varh yˆt(h) +
[
Yˆ Ht −
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆt(h)
]2)
− η
[
Yˆ H,dt −
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h)
]
Y
H
t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCC
(
(1− ΦH)Yˆ H,dt −
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h) + ΦH
1
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O(‖ξ‖3)
+ 12
varh yˆdt (h) + Yˆ H,d2t − Yˆ H,dt σ − 1σ varh yˆdt (h) + 14
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
(varh yˆdt (h))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O(‖ξ‖3)

+ η2
varh yˆt(h) + Yˆ H2t − Yˆ Ht σ − 1σ varh yˆt(h) + 14
(
σ − 1
σ
)2
(varh yˆt(h))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O(‖ξ‖3)

− ηYˆ H,dt Y Ht +
η
2
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h)Y
H
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=O(‖ξ‖3)
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3)
= UCC
(
(1− ΦH)Yˆ H,dt +
1
2 Yˆ
H,d2
t +
η
2 Yˆ
H2
t − ηYˆ H,dt Y Ht
− 12
σ − 1
σ
varh yˆdt (h) +
1
2 varh yˆ
d
t (h) +
η
2 varh yˆt(h)
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.91)
Note that since yˆt(h) = yˆdt (h), varh yˆt(h) = varh yˆdt (h). Therefore, the previ-
ous expression can be simplified to
1
n
∫ n
0
V (yt(h), zHt )dh = UCC
(
(1− ΦH)Yˆ H,dt +
1
2 Yˆ
H,d2
t +
η
2 Yˆ
H2
t − ηYˆ H,dt Y Ht
+ 12(σ
−1 + η) varh yˆt(h)
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.92)
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Combining the results
Inserting (B.92) and (B.63) into (B.58) yields
wHt = UCC
(
Cˆt +
1
2(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t − (1− ΦH)Yˆ H,dt −
1
2 Yˆ
H,d2
t −
η
2 Yˆ
H2
t + ηYˆ
H,d
t Y
H
t
− 12(σ
−1 + η) varh yˆt(h)
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.93)
Average utility among agents living in country F is derived completely anal-
ogously. Thus,
wFt = UCC
(
Cˆt +
1
2(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t − (1− ΦF )Yˆ F,dt −
1
2 Yˆ
F,d2
t −
η
2 Yˆ
F 2
t + ηYˆ
F,d
t Y
F
t
− 12(σ
−1 + η) varf yˆt(f)
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.94)
World welfare consists of the linear combination of country H’s and country
F ’s welfare with weight n and 1− n:
wt = nwHt + (1− n)wFt
= UCC
(
nCˆt + (1− n)Cˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Cˆt
+12(1− ρ)(nCˆ
2
t + (1− n)Cˆ2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Cˆ2t
)
− n(1− ΦH)Yˆ H,dt − (1− n)(1− ΦF )Yˆ F,dt −
1
2
(
nYˆ H,d
2
t + (1− n)Yˆ F,d
2
t
)
− η2
(
nYˆ H
2
t + (1− n)Yˆ F
2
t
)
+ η
(
nYˆ H,dt Y
H
t + (1− n)Yˆ F,dt Y Ht
)
− 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.95)
Inserting the expressions
Yˆ Ht = (1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt + gHt (B.96)
Yˆ Ft = −nTˆt + Cˆt + gFt (B.97)
Yˆ H,dt = (1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt (B.98)
Yˆ F,dt = −nTˆt + Cˆt (B.99)
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and simplifying yields
wt = UCC
(
Cˆt +
1
2(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
− n(1− ΦH)[(1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt]− (1− n)(1− ΦF )[−nTˆt + Cˆt]
− 12
(
n[(1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt]2 + (1− n)[−nTˆt + Cˆt]2
)
− η2
(
n[(1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt + gHt ]2 + (1− n)[−nTˆt + Cˆt + gFt ]2
)
+ η
(
n[(1− n)Tˆt + Cˆt]Y Ht + (1− n)[−nTˆt + Cˆt]Y Ft
)
− 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.100)
= UCC
(
Cˆt +
1
2(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
− (1− ΦH)n(1− n)Tˆt − nCˆt + nΦHCˆt + (1− ΦF )n(1− n)Tˆt − (1− n)Cˆt + (1− n)ΦF Cˆt
− 12
(
n(1− n)2Tˆ 2t + 2n(1− n)TˆtCˆt + nCˆ2t + (1− n)n2Tˆ 2t − 2n(1− n)TˆtCˆt + (1− n)Cˆ2t
)
− η2
(
n(1− n)2Tˆ 2t + nCˆ2t + ngHt 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p
+2n(1− n)TˆtCˆt + 2n(1− n)TˆtgHt + 2CˆtgHt
+ (1− n)n2Tˆ 2t + (1− n)Cˆ2t + (1− n)gF
2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p.
−2n(1− n)TˆtCˆt − 2n(1− n)TˆtgHt + 2CˆtgFt
)
+ η
(
n(1− n)TˆtY Ht + nCˆtY Ht − (1− n)nTˆtY Ft + (1− n)CˆtY Ft
)
− 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.101)
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Further simplification gives
wt = UCC
(
Cˆt +
1
2(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
−
(
(1− ΦH)− (1− ΦF )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0 if ΦH = ΦF
n(1− n)Tˆt−nCˆt − (1− n)Cˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Cˆt
+Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
− 12
Cˆ2t + [n(1− n)2 + (1− n)n2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=n(1−n)
Tˆ 2t

− η2
Cˆ2t + n(1− n)Tˆ 2t + 2n(1− n)Tˆt [gHt − gFt ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−gRt
+2Cˆt
[
ngHt + (1− n)gFt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=gWt

+ η
Cˆt
[
nY
H
t + (1− n)Y Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=YWt
+n(1− n)Tˆt
[
Y
H
t − Y Ft
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Y Rt

− 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.102)
This yields45
wt = UCC
(
Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
+ 12(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
+ η
(
CˆtY
W
t − n(1− n)TˆtY Rt
)
− 12
(
Cˆ2t + n(1− n)Tˆ 2t
)
− η2
(
Cˆ2t + n(1− n)Tˆ 2t + 2CˆtgWt − 2n(1− n)TˆtgRt
)
− 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.103)
45This equation corresponds to equation (E.21) in Benigno (2003), Appendix D, except
for a typo: There must be a minus sign in front of n(1− n)TˆtY Rt .
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Factoring out a minus sign yields
wt = −UCC
(
−Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
− 12(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
− η
(
CˆtY
W
t − n(1− n)TˆtY Rt
)
+ 12
(
Cˆ2t + n(1− n)Tˆ 2t
)
+ η2
(
Cˆ2t + n(1− n)Tˆ 2t + 2CˆtgWt − 2n(1− n)TˆtgRt
)
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.104)
Expanding gives
wt = −UCC
(
−Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
− 12(1− ρ)Cˆ
2
t
− ηCˆtY Wt + ηn(1− n)TˆtY Rt
+ 12Cˆ
2
t +
1
2n(1− n)Tˆ
2
t
+ η2 Cˆ
2
t +
η
2n(1− n)Tˆ
2
t + ηCˆtgWt − ηn(1− n)TˆtgRt
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.105)
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Rearranging yields
wt = −UCC
(
−Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
+ 12(ρ+ η)Cˆ
2
t − η
[
Y
W
t − gWt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(ρ+η)C˜t
Cˆt
+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)Tˆ
2
t − n(1− n) η
[
gRt − Y Rt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1+η)T˜t
Tˆt
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.106)
= −UCC
(
−Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
+ 12(ρ+ η)
[
Cˆ2t − 2C˜tCˆt
]
+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆ 2t − 2T˜tTˆt
]
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.107)
= −UCC
(
−Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
+ 12(ρ+ η)
[
Cˆ2t − 2C˜tCˆt + C˜2t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=[Cˆt−C˜t]2
− 12(ρ+ η)C˜
W 2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p
+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆ 2t − 2T˜tTˆt + T˜ 2t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=[Tˆt−T˜t]2
− 12(1 + η)n(1− n)T˜
2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=t.i.p.
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.108)
= −UCC
(
−Cˆt
[
nΦH + (1− n)ΦF
]
+ 12(ρ+ η)
[
Cˆt − C˜t
]2
+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt − T˜t
]2
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.109)
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The difference between steady-state consumption under the presence of the
monopolistic distortion C and the efficient level of consumption C∗ (situation
without the distortion) is given by
c = − ln
(
C
C∗
)
= nΦ
H + (1− n)ΦF
ρ+ η . (B.110)
Inserting yields
wt = −UCC
(
−Cˆt(ρ+ η)c
+ 12(ρ+ η)
[
Cˆt − C˜t
]2
+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt − T˜t
]2
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.111)
= −UCC
(
1
2(ρ+ η)
([
Cˆt − C˜t
]2 − 2Cˆtc)+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt − T˜t
]2
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3) (B.112)
= −UCC
(
1
2(ρ+ η)
[Cˆt − C˜t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ct
−c

2
+ 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt − T˜t
]2
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.113)
Thus,
wt = −UCC
(
1
2(ρ+ η) [ct − c]
2 + 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt − T˜t
]2
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.114)
Next, varh yˆt(h) can be linked to inflation piHt and varf yˆt(f) to piFt . Note that
varh yˆt(h) = varh yt(h) = σ2 varh pˆt(h) = σ2 varh pt(h). (B.115)
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Then, the following relationship is derived in a completely analogous way as
in Woodford (2003):
∞∑
t=0
βt varh pt(h) =
αH
(1− αH)(1− αHβ)
∞∑
t=0
βtpiH
2
t + t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.116)
Finally, calculating the discounted value of all future utility flows yields
W˜t = Et
∞∑
k=0
βkwt+k
= Et
∞∑
k=0
βk(−UCC)
(
1
2(ρ+ η) [ct+k − c]
2 + 12(1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt+k − T˜t+k
]2
+ 12(σ
−1 + η)[n varh yˆt+k(h) + (1− n) varf yˆt+k(f)]
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.117)
Thus,
W˜t = −12UCCEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
(ρ+ η) [ct+k − c]2 + (1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt+k − T˜t+k
]2
+ σ(1 + ση)n α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ)pi
H2
t+k
+ σ(1 + ση)(1− n) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ)pi
F 2
t+k
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.118)
This expression is equivalent to equation (26) in Benigno (2004) with c =
0, i.e., the monopolistic distortion is perfectly neutralized by an appropriate
subsidy, and with ct = yWt .
Dividing both sides by UCC, letting β → 1, and with c = 0, the loss function
can be written as
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(Cˆt − C˜t) + (1 + η)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση)n α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ) varpi
H
t
+ σ(1 + ση)(1− n) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ) varpi
F
t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.119)
71
Chapter 4. Monetary Union and Macroeconomic Stabilization
This equation corresponds to equation (4.2.25) in the main text.
Special case: αH = αF
When prices are equally rigid in the two countries (αH = αF ), the world welfare
loss function can be simplified further in a useful way.
When αH = αF = α, it immediately follows that
W˜t = −12UCCEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
(ρ+ η) [ct+k − c]2 + (1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt+k − T˜t+k
]2
+ σ(1 + ση) α(1− α)(1− αβ)
[
npiH
2
t+k + (1− n)piF
2
t+k
])
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.120)
The last term in square brackets can be modified in the following way:
npiH
2
t + (1− n)piF
2
t
= n
(
npiH
2
t + (1− n)piH
2
t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=piH2t
+(1− n)
(
npiF
2
t + (1− n)piF
2
t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=piF2t
= n2piH2t + n(1− n)piH
2
t + n(1− n)piF
2
t + (1− n)2piF
2
t . (B.121)
Adding 2n(1− n)piHt piFt − 2n(1− n)piHt piFt and simplifying yields
npiH
2
t + (1− n)piF
2
t = n2piH
2
t + 2n(1− n)piHt piFt + (1− n)2piF
2
t
+ n(1− n)piF 2t − 2n(1− n)piHt piFt + n(1− n)piH
2
t
= n2piH2t + 2n(1− n)piHt piFt + (1− n)2piF
2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(npiHt +(1−n)piFt )2
+ n(1− n)
(
piF
2
t − 2piHt piFt + piH
2
t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(piFt −piHt )2
=
(
npiHt + (1− n)piFt
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
piW
2
t
+n(1− n)
(
piFt − piHt
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
piR
2
t
= piW 2t + n(1− n)piR
2
t . (B.122)
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The world welfare loss function is, then, given by
W˜t = −12UCCEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
(ρ+ η) [ct+k − c]2 + (1 + η)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt+k − T˜t+k
]2
+ σ(1 + ση) α(1− α)(1− αβ)
[
piW
2
t+k + n(1− n)piR
2
t+k
])
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.123)
Dividing both sides by UCC, letting β → 1, and with c = 0, the loss function
can be written as
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(Cˆt − C˜t) + (1 + η)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση) α(1− α)(1− αβ)
[
varpiWt + n(1− n) var piRt
])
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.124)
This equation corresponds to equation (4.2.26) in the main text.
Version containing country-specific output gaps
The welfare loss function can be expressed alternatively in terms of the country-
specific output gaps instead of the consumption gap. This makes the analogy
to the closed-economy counterpart, which is expressed in terms of the output
gap as well, more obvious.
Inserting the gap version of the equations for aggregate demand
Yˆ Ht − Y˜ Ht = (1− n)(Tˆt − T˜t) + Cˆt − C˜t (B.125)
Yˆ Ft − Y˜ Ft = −n(Tˆt − T˜t) + Cˆt − C˜t (B.126)
into the weighted average of the squared output gaps yields
n(Yˆ Ht − Y˜ Ht )2 + (1− n)(Yˆ Ft − Y˜ Ft )2 = n(1− n)(Tˆt− T˜t)2 + (Cˆt− C˜t)2. (B.127)
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Solving this equation for (Cˆt − C˜t)2 and inserting the resulting expression into
equation (B.118) with c = 0 yields
W˜t = −12UCCEt
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
(ρ+ η)
[
n(Yˆ Ht+k − Y˜ Ht+k)2 + (1− n)(Yˆ Ft+k − Y˜ Ft+k)2
]
+ (1− ρ)n(1− n)
[
Tˆt+k − T˜t+k
]2
+ σ(1 + ση)n α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ)pi
H2
t+k
+ σ(1 + ση)(1− n) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ)pi
F 2
t+k
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.128)
Expressed in variances, the welfare loss function is then given by
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η)
[
n var(Yˆ Ht − Y˜ Ht ) + (1− n) var(Yˆ Ft − Y˜ Ft )
]
+ (1− ρ)n(1− n) var(Tˆt − T˜t)
+ σ(1 + ση)n α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ) varpi
H
t
+ σ(1 + ση)(1− n) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ) varpi
F
t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (B.129)
This welfare loss function closely resembles those in Benigno and Benigno
(2006, eq. 21) as well as in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2011, eq. 40).
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B.4. Variances
To obtain analytical expressions for the variance of the terms-of-trade gap and of
the inflation differential under each monetary regime, I first derive the recursive
laws of motion (RLOM). Then I set up the corresponding vector autoregressive
(VAR) model of the system of equations. Finally, since the matrix algebra is
very extensive, I use MATLAB Symbolic Math Toolbox to obtain the expres-
sions of interest from the variance-covariance matrix.
The derivations in this Appendix are only valid if the degree of price stick-
iness and the persistence of productivity shocks are identical across countries
(αH = αF and ρH = ρF ) and if monetary policy does not engage in interest
rate smoothing (φR = 0). As shown in Section 4.3, the variables consumption
and world inflation need not be considered as they behave identically across
monetary regimes and independently of the variables terms of trade, nominal
exchange rate and inflation differential.
Monetary union regime
The number of equations can be reduced by subtracting the New Keynesian
Phillips curve of country H (B.42) from the one of country F (B.43). As a
result, the consumption gap vanishes due to kHC = kFC . The second equation is
given by the terms-of-trade identity (B.44). The resulting system of equations
is, then, given by
piRt = −kT (Tˆt − T˜t) + βEtpiRt+1 (B.130)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piRt . (B.131)
The general form of the corresponding RLOM is given by
Tˆt = b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜t (B.132)
piRt = b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t (B.133)
T˜t = ρH T˜t−1 − η1 + ην
R
t , (B.134)
where νRt = νFt − νHt . Equation (B.134) is obtained by inserting the country-
specific shock processes (B.38) into the equation of the flexible-price terms of
trade (B.33).
75
Chapter 4. Monetary Union and Macroeconomic Stabilization
To obtain the unknown coefficients as functions of the deep parameters of the
model, I use the method of undetermined coefficients. First, inserting equations
(B.132) through (B.134) into equations (B.130) and (B.131) and rearranging
yields
b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t =[−kT b1 + βb2b1]Tˆt−1 (B.135)
+ [−kT (c1 − 1) + βb2c1 + βc2ρH ]T˜t
b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜t =[1 + b2]Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t. (B.136)
Setting Tˆt−1 = 1, T˜t = 0 and Tˆt−1 = 0, T˜t = 1 respectively gives the following
four conditions for the four unknown coefficients:
b2 =− kT b1 + βb2b1 (B.137)
c2 =− kT (c1 − 1) + βb2c1 + βc2ρH (B.138)
b1 =1 + b2 (B.139)
c1 =c2. (B.140)
Straightforward manipulation yields the quadratic equation
0 = βb21 − (1 + kT + β)b1 + 1 (B.141)
and therefore two solutions for b1. Only one solution fulfills the requirement
for a stable equilibrium, i.e., |b1| < 1. Using b1 immediately yields the other
coefficients. Thus, the coefficients of the RLOM take the following form:
b1 =
1 + kT + β −
√
(1 + kT + β)2 − 4β
2β (B.142)
b2 =
1 + kT − β −
√
(1 + kT + β)2 − 4β
2β (B.143)
c1 = c2 = c =
kT
1 + kT + β(1− ρH − b1) . (B.144)
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The corresponding VAR model can be written as follows46:

piRt
Tˆt
T˜t
 =

0 b2 ρHc
0 b1 ρHc
0 0 ρH

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A

piRt−1
Tˆt−1
T˜t−1
−

c η1+η
c η1+η
η
1+η

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
νt.
A closed-form solution of the variance-covariance matrix Σ can be obtained
in terms of the vec operator as follows:47
vec(Σ) = (I − A⊗ A)−1 vec(B), (B.145)
where I denotes the identity matrix.
Since matrix A is of dimension 3 × 3, matrix A ⊗ A is of dimension 9 × 9.
Although matrix A ⊗ A is triangular, calculating the inverse of that matrix is
very cumbersome. Therefore, I resort to MATLAB Symbolic Math Toolbox.
Further simplification of the resulting expressions finally yields
varMU(Tˆt − T˜t) =
[
(1 + ρHb1)c2
(1− b21)(1− ρHb1)
− 2c1− ρHb1 + 1
]
var T˜t (B.146)
varMU piRt =
2c2
(1 + b1)(1− ρHb1)(1 + ρH) var T˜t (B.147)
var T˜t =
1
1− ρ2H
(
η
1 + η
)2 [
var νHt + var νFt − 2 cov(νHt , νFt )
]
.
(B.148)
Flexible exchange rate regime
The derivation of the variances under the FX regime follows the exact same
steps as under the MU regime. The number of equations can be reduced by
subtracting the New Keynesian Phillips curves from each other. Furthermore,
the expected change in the nominal exchange rate can be expressed as a function
of the inflation differential and the terms of trade by inserting the interest rate
rules (B.55) and (B.56) as well as the equations for aggregate demand (B.49)
and (B.50) into the uncovered interest parity condition (B.54). The resulting
46The order of variables was chosen as to render matrix A and therefore matrix A ⊗ A
triangular. This facilitates the calculation of the determinant considerably, since, in that case,
the determinant is simply given by the product of the diagonal elements.
47See, e.g., Hamilton (1994).
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system of equations is, then, given by
piRt = −kT (Tˆt − T˜t) + βEtpiRt+1 (B.149)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + piRt + ∆Sˆt (B.150)
Et∆Sˆt+1 = −φpipiRt + φY Tˆt. (B.151)
The general form of the corresponding RLOM is given by
Tˆt = b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜t (B.152)
piRt = b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t (B.153)
∆Sˆt = b3Tˆt−1 + c3T˜t (B.154)
T˜t = ρH T˜t−1 − η1 + ην
R
t . (B.155)
Inserting equations (B.152) through (B.155) into equations (B.149) through
(B.150) and rearranging yields
b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜t =[−kT b1 + βb2b1]Tˆt−1 (B.156)
+ [−kT (c1 − 1) + βb2c1 + βc2ρH ]T˜t
b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜t =[1 + b2 + b3]Tˆt−1 + [c2 + c3]T˜t (B.157)
b1b3Tˆt−1 + [b3c1 + c3ρH ]T˜t =[−φpib2 + φY b1]Tˆt−1 (B.158)
+ [−φpic2 + φY c1]T˜t.
Setting Tˆt−1 = 1, T˜t = 0 and Tˆt−1 = 0, T˜t = 1 respectively gives the following
six conditions for the six unknown coefficients:
b2 =− kT b1 + βb2b1 (B.159)
c2 =− kT (c1 − 1) + βb2c1 + βc2ρH (B.160)
b1 =1 + b2 + b3 (B.161)
c1 =c2 + c3 (B.162)
b1b3 =− φpib2 + φY b1 (B.163)
b3c1 + c3ρH =− φpic2 + φY c1. (B.164)
Straightforward manipulation yields the quadratic equation
0 = βb21 − [1 + kT + (1 + φY )β]b1 + (1 + φpikT + φY ). (B.165)
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In this case, there are either two real or two imaginary solutions for b1, depend-
ing on the realizations of the deep parameters. However, neither solution fulfills
the requirement for a stable equilibrium. Yet, b1 = 0 is another solution to the
above system of equations, and it implies a stable equilibrium, since |b1| < 1.
Given b1 = 0, the coefficients of the RLOM take the following form:
b1 = 0 (B.166)
b2 = 0 (B.167)
b3 = −1 (B.168)
c1 =
(φpi − ρH)kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH) (B.169)
c2 =
(1− ρH + φY )kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH) (B.170)
c3 =
(φpi − 1− φY )kT
(φpi − ρH)kT + (1− ρH + φY )(1− βρH) . (B.171)
The corresponding VAR model can be written as follows48:

∆Sˆt
Tˆt
piRt
T˜t
 =

0 −1 0 ρHc3
0 0 0 ρHc1
0 0 0 ρHc2
0 0 0 ρH

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A

∆Sˆt−1
Tˆt−1
piRt−1
T˜t−1
−

c3
η
1+η
c1
η
1+η
c2
η
1+η
η
1+η

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡B
νt.
A closed-form solution of the variance-covariance matrix Σ can be obtained
in terms of the vec operator as follows:49
vec(Σ) = (I − A⊗ A)−1 vec(B), (B.172)
where I denotes the identity matrix.
Since matrix A is of dimension 4× 4, matrix A⊗ A is of dimension 16× 16.
Although matrix A ⊗ A is triangular, calculating the inverse of that matrix is
very cumbersome. Therefore, I resort to MATLAB Symbolic Math Toolbox.
48The order of variables was chosen as to render matrix A and therefore matrix A ⊗ A
triangular. This facilitates the calculation of the determinant considerably, since, in that case,
the determinant is simply given by the product of the diagonal elements.
49See, e.g., Hamilton (1994).
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Further simplification of the resulting expressions finally yields
varFX(Tˆt − T˜t) = (c1 − 1)2 var T˜t (B.173)
varFX piRt = c22 var T˜t (B.174)
var T˜t =
1
1− ρ2H
(
η
1 + η
)2 [
var νHt + var νFt − 2 cov(νHt , νFt )
]
.
(B.175)
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5.1. Introduction
Over the decades since its initiation by Mundell (1961), the Optimum Cur-
rency Area (OCA) literature has identified numerous criteria that are considered
important in determining whether countries benefit from forming a monetary
union. These OCA criteria typically comprise the economic characteristics of
the countries involved, such as the degree of labor mobility, the degree of price
and wage flexibility, or the degree of trade openness.1
In this study, I argue that one OCA criterion has not yet been emphasized
sufficiently, although it is absolutely critical for the welfare implications of mone-
tary unification: the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, using a standard
two-country New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model, I systematically demonstrate how and why different types of rule-based
interest rate policies lead to different welfare rankings between a monetary union
and a flexible exchange rate regime. These interest rate policies differ in terms of
both the choice of the target variables and the strength of the response to these
variables. Both dimensions can be decisive in determining whether countries
benefit from forming a monetary union.2
When monetary policy in each country responds to inflation aggressively or
implements a high degree of interest rate smoothing, forming a monetary union,
where the common monetary policy continues to follow the same interest rate
policy, tends to make countries worse off in terms of welfare by decreasing
macroeconomic stability. However, when monetary policy responds to inflation
only modestly or implements a low degree of interest rate smoothing, forming a
monetary union tends to make countries better off by increasing macroeconomic
stability. When monetary policy responds to output, forming a monetary union
is almost always beneficial.
The conduct of monetary policy is not only an independent OCA criterion
in itself, but it can also modify the nature of other OCA criteria, such as the
degree of trade openness. Whether an increase in the degree of trade openness
1Summarizing the vast OCA literature is beyond the scope of this study. Excellent surveys
are Mongelli (2002), Dellas and Tavlas (2009), Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), and De Grauwe
(2012).
2The present study builds on my previous research (Groll, 2013) and elaborates on the
importance of monetary policy for the welfare implications of monetary unification. Also,
the present study employs a more general model that allows, among other things, for trade
imbalances, deviations from purchasing power parity (i.e., real exchange rate fluctuations),
and more variation in the conduct of monetary policy.
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increases the likelihood of a monetary union being beneficial, as proposed by
the vast bulk of previous OCA studies, depends critically on whether monetary
policy targets producer price inflation or consumer price inflation. If monetary
policy targets producer price inflation, it is also possible that an increase in the
degree of trade openness decreases the likelihood of a monetary union being
beneficial.
The most important reason why monetary policy is crucial for the welfare
implications of monetary unification is as follows. Monetary policy determines
whether and to what extent a flexible nominal exchange rate fosters or ham-
pers macroeconomic stabilization, even if monetary policy does not target the
nominal exchange rate explicitly. The flexibility of the nominal exchange rate
renders monetary policy more potent under a flexible exchange rate regime in
the sense that monetary policy affects all welfare-relevant variables directly. By
contrast, in a monetary union, the influence of monetary policy is limited, es-
pecially with respect to relative prices such as the terms of trade and the real
exchange rate.
The fact that monetary policy is more potent under a flexible exchange rate
regime is a double-edged sword. When the interest rate policy is specified such
that the nominal exchange rate moves in the “right” direction (which will be
defined precisely), forming a monetary union generally reduces macroeconomic
stability and thus welfare, because it eliminates the stabilizing effects of the
nominal exchange rate. This is especially true if monetary policy can implement
the optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) policy, as is assumed frequently in the
literature.
However, the information that is required to implement such an optimal pol-
icy is usually not available in practice. Even the specification of a simple interest
rate rule that is expected to move the nominal exchange rate in the right di-
rection is not always obvious ex ante. For example, an interest rate policy that
induces the nominal exchange rate to move in the right direction in a rather
closed economy can induce it to move in the wrong direction in a very open
economy.
When the interest rate policy is specified such that the nominal exchange rate
moves in the wrong direction, forming a monetary union increases macroeco-
nomic stability and thus welfare, because it eliminates the destabilizing effects
of the nominal exchange rate. Essentially, the nominal exchange rate does not
compensate for monetary policy mistakes, but instead it reinforces them. In
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this sense, a monetary union provides a protective mechanism against mone-
tary policy mistakes.
Certain interest rate policies render a monetary union beneficial, although
they push the nominal exchange rate in the right direction in a flexible exchange
rate regime. In these cases, countries benefit from monetary unification due to
higher inflation stability. One example is a very modest response to inflation.3
In practice, there are many temptations to implement such a lax policy. In
times with a (private or public) debt overhang, monetary policy might let the
inflation rate overshoot the inflation target for a prolonged period of time, with
the aim of reducing the real debt burden and lowering borrowing costs. In times
of high unemployment, allowing inflation to temporarily overshoot the target
might also seem attractive, with the aim of reducing real wages in the presence
of fixed-term nominal wage contracts, thereby increasing the demand for labor.
These temptations lead to a related problem, which is also less severe in a
monetary union. A country that is unable to credibly commit itself to withstand
these types of temptations suffers from a persistently high level of inflation.
If it forms a monetary union with a country that does not suffer from such
commitment problems, it benefits from a lower level of inflation by eliminating
the so-called inflation bias (Alesina and Barro, 2002).4
However, this point differs from the point made in the present study in at
least two important respects. First, the benefit of eliminating an inflation bias
is related to the level of inflation, whereas the benefit described in the present
study is related to the stability of inflation. Second, the benefit of eliminating an
inflation bias is not inherent to a monetary union because it is only obtained if
the monetary policy after monetary unification is more credible than that before
monetary unification. By contrast, the benefit described in the present study is
inherent to a monetary union because it is obtained even if the monetary policy
after monetary unification continues to make the same mistake it made before
monetary unification. This is because the same policy mistake is less harmful
in a monetary union.
3That is, the inflation coefficient in the interest rate rule is above but close to one.
4Note that the “currency union” in Alesina and Barro (2002) refers to a situation where a
client country unilaterally adopts the currency of an anchor country—a situation also known
as dollarization. Nevertheless, the benefit of eliminating an inflation bias also exists if the
client and anchor country form a monetary union where the common monetary policy inherits
the credibility of the anchor country. In Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), the “advantage of tying
one’s hands” follows the same logic, although they refer to the former European Monetary
System (1979–1999).
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One reason for the inability to withstand the temptations mentioned above
is a lack of “discipline and institutions that can provide a firm domestic com-
mitment to a monetary policy that is dedicated to price stability” (Alesina and
Barro, 2001, p. 382). It seems very likely that such weak institutions not only
lead to a high level of inflation, but also to a poor stabilization of inflation. If
this is the case, the trade-off that countries face when forming a monetary union
between relinquishing national monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion device and gaining credibility to reduce undesired inflation, as stressed by
Alesina and Barro (2002), does not exist.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly out-
lines the structure of the model. Section 5.3 shows how different interest rate
policies lead to different welfare rankings between a monetary union and a flex-
ible exchange rate regime. Section 5.4 shows how different interest rate policies
change the nature of the traditional OCA criterion of “trade openness.” Section
5.5 concludes this study.
5.2. Model
The model I use is a standard two-country New Keynesian DSGE model, and
thus I provide only a very brief description. The model features two interna-
tional monetary regimes:
1. A monetary union (MU) regime: Both countries share the same currency.
A common monetary policy governs the common nominal interest rate.
2. A flexible exchange rate (FX) regime: Each country maintains its national
currency and conducts its own, independent monetary policy. Nominal
interest rates are country-specific. The nominal exchange rate between
the two currencies is flexible.
The FX version of the model, including the microfounded, quadratic welfare
measure, is described in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2011). The MU version
of the model is largely identical (see, e.g., Benigno, 2004). The model economy
features two countries of equal size (labeled H and F ), where there is trade in
5Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that countries with higher levels of inflation also
tend to experience a higher variability of inflation (early examples are Okun, 1971; Taylor,
1981). The latter study also presents a theoretical model where a “policy under-reaction”
to inflation causes high and variable inflation. Similarly, Friedman (1977) establishes a link
between weak institutions and high and variable inflation.
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consumption goods (as opposed to trade in intermediate goods). The consump-
tion baskets are allowed to differ among countries, so purchasing power parity
does not necessarily hold. International asset markets are complete, i.e., risk
sharing is perfect across countries. Producers act in an environment of monop-
olistic competition. The only factor of production is labor, which is immobile
between countries. The only rigidity is the nominal price rigidity in the spirit
of Calvo (1983).
Under the FX regime, prices are set in the currency of the producer’s country
(“producer currency pricing”), i.e., the producer does not discriminate the price
between countries. The law of one price holds and exchange rate pass-through
is complete. Complete asset markets imply that uncovered interest parity holds.
In both regimes, monetary policy is conducted via Taylor-type interest rate
rules. Importantly, I assume that monetary policy is not able to observe the
flexible-price equilibrium of the economy, particularly the flexible-price interest
rate and flexible-price output, because this information is usually not available
in practice. Thus, monetary policy responds to inflation (either producer price
inflation or consumer price inflation) and to output (deviation from the steady
state), rather than to the output gap (deviation from flexible-price output).
5.2.1. Model equations
The equations of the complete log-linearized model are shown below (for the
full derivation, see Appendices C.1 and C.2). Deviations of the logarithm of a
variable Xt from its steady state are denoted by Xˆt if prices are sticky and by
X˜fbt if prices are flexible and markups are neutralized (efficient allocation). The
variables and parameters are defined in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
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Table 5.1.: Variables
Ct, C
∗
t Consumption in country H and F , respectively
YH,t, YF,t Output in country H and F , respectively
piH,t, pi
∗
F,t Producer price inflation in country H and F , respectively
pit, pi
∗
t Consumer price inflation in country H and F , respectively
piMUt Union-wide inflation (average of country-specific inflation)
Rt, R
∗
t Nominal interest rate in country H and F , respectively
RMUt Nominal interest rate in monetary union
Tt Terms of trade
St Nominal exchange rate
Qt Real exchange rate
ζY,t, ζ
∗
Y,t Productivity shock in country H and F , respectively
ζC,t, ζ
∗
C,t Consumption preference shock in country H and F , respectively
µHt , µ
F
t Cost-push (or markup) shock in country H and F , respectively
Table 5.2.: Parameters
ρ Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
β Discount factor
η Inverse of elasticity of producing the differentiated good
a Home bias/degree of trade openness
σ Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods within countries
θ Elasticity of substitution between goods across countries
αi Probability of not being able to reset the price in country i = H,F
φpi Inflation coefficient in interest rate rule
φY Output coefficient in interest rate rule
φR Interest rate smoothing coefficient in interest rate rule
ρi Persistence of productivity shock in country i = H,F
kiY k
i
Y =
(1−αiβ)(1−αi)
αi
ρ+η
1+ση
kiT k
i
T =
(1−αiβ)(1−αi)
αi
ρθ−1
1+ση
kiµ k
i
µ =
(1−αiβ)(1−αi)
αi
1
1+ση
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Sticky-price equilibrium under the FX regime
Under sticky prices, the model equations for the FX regime are given by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(
Rˆt − Etpit+1 + EtζˆC,t+1 − ζˆC,t
)
(5.2.1)
Qˆt = ρ
(
Cˆt − Cˆ∗t
)
+
(
ζˆ∗C,t − ζˆC,t
)
(5.2.2)
Et∆Sˆt+1 = Rˆt − Rˆ∗t (5.2.3)
Qˆt = (2a− 1)Tˆt (5.2.4)
YˆH,t = 2a(1− a)θTˆt + aCˆt + (1− a)Cˆ∗t (5.2.5)
YˆF,t = −2a(1− a)θTˆt + (1− a)Cˆt + aCˆ∗t (5.2.6)
piH,t = kHY
(
YˆH,t − Y˜ fbH,t
)
− 2a(1− a)kHT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kHµ µˆHt + βEtpiH,t+1
(5.2.7)
pi∗F,t = kFY
(
YˆF,t − Y˜ fbF,t
)
+ 2a(1− a)kFT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kFµ µˆFt + βEtpi∗F,t+1 (5.2.8)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + pi∗F,t − piH,t + ∆Sˆt (5.2.9)
pit = apiH,t + (1− a)(pi∗F,t + ∆Sˆt) (5.2.10)
pi∗t = (1− a)(piH,t −∆Sˆt) + api∗F,t. (5.2.11)
Following standard Taylor-type interest rate rules, monetary policy in each
country responds to output and some measure of inflation. If monetary policy
responds to producer price inflation, the interest rate rules for each country are
given by
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiH,t + φY YˆH,t) (5.2.12)
Rˆ∗t = φRRˆ∗t−1 + (1− φR)(φpipi∗F,t + φY YˆF,t). (5.2.13)
If monetary policy responds to consumer price inflation, the interest rate rules
are given by
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipit + φY YˆH,t) (5.2.14)
Rˆ∗t = φRRˆ∗t−1 + (1− φR)(φpipi∗t + φY YˆF,t). (5.2.15)
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Sticky-price equilibrium under the MU regime
Under sticky prices, the model equations for the MU regime are given by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(
RˆMUt − Etpit+1 + EtζˆC,t+1 − ζˆC,t
)
(5.2.16)
Qˆt = ρ
(
Cˆt − Cˆ∗t
)
+
(
ζˆ∗C,t − ζˆC,t
)
(5.2.17)
Qˆt = (2a− 1)Tˆt (5.2.18)
YˆH,t = 2a(1− a)θTˆt + aCˆt + (1− a)Cˆ∗t (5.2.19)
YˆF,t = −2a(1− a)θTˆt + (1− a)Cˆt + aCˆ∗t (5.2.20)
piH,t = kHY
(
YˆH,t − Y˜ fbH,t
)
− 2a(1− a)kHT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kHµ µˆHt + βEtpiH,t+1
(5.2.21)
pi∗F,t = kFY
(
YˆF,t − Y˜ fbF,t
)
+ 2a(1− a)kFT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kFµ µˆFt + βEtpi∗F,t+1 (5.2.22)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + pi∗F,t − piH,t (5.2.23)
pit = apiH,t + (1− a)pi∗F,t (5.2.24)
pi∗t = (1− a)piH,t + api∗F,t. (5.2.25)
The common monetary policy responds to union-wide inflation (average country-
specific inflation) and union-wide output (average country-specific output). How-
ever, whether the common monetary policy responds to producer price inflation
or consumer price inflation does not make a difference. Using equations (5.2.24)
and (5.2.25), it is straightforward to show that the average of consumer price
inflation rates is equal to the average of producer price inflation rates:
pit + pi∗t
2 =
piH,t + pi∗F,t
2 ≡ pi
MU
t . (5.2.26)
Accordingly, the interest rate rule of the common monetary policy can be writ-
ten in either case as
RˆMUt = φRRˆMUt−1 + (1− φR)
(
φpipi
MU
t + φY
YˆH,t + YˆF,t
2
)
. (5.2.27)
Efficient allocation under both regimes
The following equations describe the first-best (fb) or efficient allocation, where
prices are fully flexible and markups are neutralized at all times with an appro-
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priate subsidy (µit = 0). This efficient allocation provides a useful benchmark
for assessing the welfare implications of the two international monetary regimes.
The efficient output in each country is given by
(ρ+ η)Y˜ fbH,t =2a(1− a)(ρθ − 1)T˜ fbt
− (1− a)
(
ζˆC,t − ζˆ∗C,t
)
+ ζˆC,t + ηζˆY,t (5.2.28)
(ρ+ η)Y˜ fbF,t =− 2a(1− a)(ρθ − 1)T˜ fbt
+ (1− a)
(
ζˆC,t − ζˆ∗C,t
)
+ ζˆ∗C,t + ηζˆ∗Y,t. (5.2.29)
The efficient terms of trade can be written as
[4a(1− a)ρθ+ (2a− 1)2]T˜ fbt = ρ
(
Y˜ fbH,t − Y˜ fbF,t
)
− (2a− 1)
(
ζˆC,t − ζˆ∗C,t
)
. (5.2.30)
5.2.2. Model description
Consumption is described by standard Euler equations, which are given by
equations (5.2.1) and (5.2.16) in the case of country H. The difference between
these two Euler equations is that the nominal interest rate is country-specific
under the FX regime, whereas it is common to both countries under the MU
regime. The risk sharing condition, which describes the link between consump-
tion across countries, is identical across regimes and it is given by (5.2.2) and
(5.2.17), respectively. Purchasing power parity does not hold, i.e., the real ex-
change rate is not constant, unless consumption and consumption preference
shocks are perfectly correlated across countries. Under the FX regime, perfect
risk sharing implies that the uncovered interest parity (5.2.3) holds, i.e., the
expected change in the nominal exchange rate corresponds to the interest rate
differential across countries.6 This equation is obsolete under the MU regime
because both countries share the same currency and a common nominal interest
rate.
The link between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade is described
by equations (5.2.4) and (5.2.18), respectively. Accordingly, the correlation
6Combining the Euler consumption equation for country H, the risk sharing condition,
and the uncovered interest parity condition yields the Euler consumption equation for country
F , which is therefore redundant. Alternatively, the model can be specified by including both
country-specific Euler consumption equations and the risk sharing condition, while omitting
the uncovered interest parity condition. The model specification I employ includes the un-
covered interest parity condition because it more clearly illustrates the economic mechanisms
that underlie the results of this study.
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between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade can be positive, zero, or
negative, depending on the degree of trade openness between the two countries.
Aggregate demand in each country depends on consumption in both countries
and the terms of trade and is given by equations (5.2.5), (5.2.6), (5.2.19), and
(5.2.20), respectively. The country-specific New Keynesian Phillips curves are
also identical across regimes and they are given by (5.2.7), (5.2.8), (5.2.21), and
(5.2.22), respectively. In contrast to a closed-economy framework, not only the
output gap but also the terms-of-trade gap (the difference between the sticky-
price and the efficient terms of trade) affect producer price inflation.
The terms-of-trade identity is given by equation (5.2.9) under the FX regime
and by equation (5.2.23) under the MU regime, which differ due to the pres-
ence of the nominal exchange rate in the former. Equations (5.2.10), (5.2.11),
(5.2.24), and (5.2.25) describe the relationship between the consumer price infla-
tion rate and the producer price inflation rates in each country. Likewise, these
equations only differ across regimes in terms of the presence of the nominal
exchange rate.
Monetary policy is conducted via Taylor-type interest rate rules, according
to which it responds to output and some measure of inflation. Under the FX
regime, the interest rate rules for each country are given by equations (5.2.12)
and (5.2.13) if monetary policy responds to producer price inflation, and by
equations (5.2.14) and (5.2.15) if monetary policy responds to consumer price
inflation. Under the MU regime, whether the common monetary policy re-
sponds to producer price inflation or consumer price inflation does not make a
difference. In both cases, the interest rate rule is given by equation (5.2.27).7
Under flexible prices, monetary policy is neutral and real variables are driven
only by productivity shocks and consumption preference shocks. Thus, the
efficient allocation, which is given by equations (5.2.28) through (5.2.30), is the
same under both international monetary regimes.
5.2.3. Welfare loss function
The welfare analysis follows the logic of the familiar linear-quadratic approach,
where log-linear model equations are used to evaluate a quadratic welfare loss
measure (Woodford, 2003). The world welfare loss function is given by the
7Throughout this study, I only consider interest rate rules with a contemporaneous re-
sponse to output and inflation. However, forward-looking and backward-looking interest rate
rules do not change the main conclusions of this study.
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discounted value of a weighted average across countries of the average utility
flow of agents using a second-order Taylor series expansion.8 It is assumed that
the distortion induced by monopolistic competition is offset by an appropriate
subsidy, thereby ensuring efficiency in the steady state. Thus,
Wt = −12
(
(ρ+ η) var(YˆH,t − Y˜ fbH,t) + (ρ+ η) var(YˆF,t − Y˜ fbF,t)
− 2a(1− a)ρθ − 1
ρ
[
4a(1− a)ρθ + (2a− 1)2
]
var(Tˆt − T˜ fbt )
+ σ(1 + ση) α
H
(1− αH)(1− αHβ) varpiH,t
+ σ(1 + ση) α
F
(1− αF )(1− αFβ) varpi
∗
F,t
)
+ t.i.p.+O(‖ξ‖3). (5.2.31)
As in the closed economy, the welfare loss depends on the producer price
inflation rate and the output gap. In the open economy, the welfare loss also
depends on the terms-of-trade gap. Intuitively, when the terms of trade deviate
from their efficient level, the resulting allocation of production across countries
is inefficient due to the presence of price stickiness. The weights in front of each
component of the welfare loss function are functions of the deep parameters
of the model. The term t.i.p. contains all the terms that are independent of
monetary policy and the international monetary regime. The term O(‖ξ‖3)
contains third and higher order terms, which can be neglected provided that
the model equations are log-linear, i.e., first-order approximations of the non-
linear equilibrium conditions.
5.2.4. Calibration
Unless stated otherwise, the parameters of the model are calibrated to the val-
ues displayed in Table 5.3 (see also Benigno, 2004). For the sake of simplicity,
the two countries are assumed to be symmetric. A value of 0.99 for the discount
factor β implies a steady-state real interest rate of around 4.1 percent annually.
A value of 7.66 for the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods σ
implies a steady-state markup of prices over marginal costs of 15 percent. A
8Computing country-specific welfare would complicate the calculations significantly be-
cause more accurate approximations of the non-linear model equations would be necessary
(Benigno and Woodford, 2005), which is beyond the scope of this study.
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value of 0.75 for the probability of not being able to reset the price αi implies
an average duration of price contracts of 4 quarters.
Table 5.3.: Baseline calibration
ρ 1/6 Inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
β 0.99 Discount factor
η 0.67 Inverse of elasticity of producing the differentiated good
wy 0.5 Production elasticity of average real wage
γ 0.75 Labor income share
a 0.75 Home bias/degree of trade openness
σ 7.66 Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods within countries
θ 2 Elasticity of substitution between goods across countries
αi 0.75 Probability of not being able to reset the price in country i = H,F
φpi 1.5 Inflation coefficient in interest rate rule
φY 0 Output coefficient in interest rate rule
φR 0 Interest rate smoothing coefficient in interest rate rule
ρi 0.9 Persistence of productivity shock in country i = H,F
The degree of trade openness a is calibrated to 0.75, which corresponds to
a steady-state share of home-produced goods in the consumption basket of 75
percent in each country (i.e., a home bias in consumption) and a steady-state
trade-to-GDP ratio of 50 percent.9 This roughly equals the average trade-to-
GDP ratio across OECD countries. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)
and Benigno (2004), the inverse of the elasticity of producing the differentiated
good η is calculated as
η = wy − ρ+ 1− γ
γ
, (5.2.32)
where wy denotes the elasticity of the average real wage with respect to pro-
duction and γ denotes the labor income share.
Under the baseline calibration, monetary policy responds to inflation (φpi =
1.5), but it does not respond to output (φY = 0) and does not engage in interest
rate smoothing (φR = 0). All interest rate rule coefficients are assumed to be
identical across countries and regimes. Finally, the persistence of the produc-
tivity shock is 0.9 in each country and the cross-country correlation is zero.
I abstract from consumption preference shocks and cost-push shocks because
they do not change the main conclusions of this study.
9The trade-to-GDP ratio expressed in percent is given by 2(1− a)× 100.
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5.3. Monetary policy as an OCA criterion
In the following, I use the theoretical model described in the previous section
to show that the conduct of monetary policy is a critical criterion for the wel-
fare implications of the MU regime relative to the FX regime. The conduct
of monetary policy is modified in two dimensions: (1) the coefficients in the
interest rate rules that determine the response of monetary policy to inflation
(Section 5.3.1), to output (Section 5.3.2), and to past realizations of the interest
rate (Section 5.3.3); and (2) the measure of inflation to which monetary policy
responds, i.e., producer price inflation (henceforth PPI inflation targeting) or
consumer price inflation (henceforth CPI inflation targeting).
5.3.1. Response to inflation
The aggressiveness of monetary policy in its response to inflation is an important
criterion that determines whether countries are better off under the MU regime
or under the FX regime (Figure 5.1, upper left panel). If the response to inflation
is relatively modest (i.e., low values of φpi), the two countries are better off under
the MU regime. If the response to inflation is relatively strong, the two countries
are better off under the FX regime. The threshold value of φpi beyond which the
FX regime becomes superior in terms of welfare depends on whether monetary
policy targets PPI inflation or CPI inflation.10 Under CPI inflation targeting,
the threshold value for φpi is lower than that under PPI inflation targeting, i.e.,
the two countries are less likely to be better off under the MU regime.
The welfare ranking between the MU and the FX regime is driven almost
exclusively by the variance of PPI inflation, which exhibits the same pattern
with respect to φpi as the welfare loss (Figure 5.1, lower right panel).11 This is
because agents attach by far the highest weight to inflation, which is tradition-
ally the case in microfounded welfare measures derived from New Keynesian
models. Accordingly, the cost of a higher variance of the output gap and of
the terms-of-trade gap under the MU regime (Figure 5.1, upper right and lower
left panel) may be outweighed by the benefit of a lower variance of PPI infla-
10Under the MU regime, PPI inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting are the same
policy (recall equation 5.2.27).
11Although the welfare loss depends on the output gap and the PPI inflation rate of both
countries, Figure 5.1 shows only one of each because the variances are identical in both
countries due to the assumption of symmetric countries.
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Figure 5.1.: World welfare loss and variances of welfare-relevant variables as
a function of the inflation coefficient (φpi)
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tion. This is the case for low values of φpi, i.e., a relatively modest response of
monetary policy to inflation.12
The two countries are better off under the FX regime for a sufficiently strong
response of monetary policy to inflation (either PPI or CPI inflation) because
monetary policy is more potent under the FX regime than under the MU regime.
This becomes clear if the number of policy instruments is compared to the
number of welfare-relevant distortions in the economy. Under the FX regime,
there are as many policy instruments as distortions in the economy. These
distortions are due to monopolistic competition and to sticky prices.13
The distortion due to monopolistic competition induces an inefficiently low
level of aggregate output. This distortion can be eliminated by an appropriate
subsidy in each country. The distortion due to sticky prices induces inefficient
markup fluctuations, which lead to inefficiently low or high levels of aggregate
output, and an inefficient dispersion of prices in the presence of inflation, which
causes an inefficient dispersion of output across the producers of differentiated
goods within each country. This distortion can be mitigated or even eliminated
12A brief explanation of why PPI inflation may be more stable under the MU regime is
given in Section 5.3.3. A detailed explanation is given in Groll (2013).
13Both distortions are common to the closed-economy framework (see, e.g., Woodford,
2003, for details).
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by monetary policy in each country by using the nominal interest rate to reduce
the fluctuations of inflation around zero as far as possible.
By contrast, under the MU regime, there are less policy instruments than dis-
tortions. First, monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate for both countries
and thus it can no longer target inflation in each country separately, thereby
losing one policy instrument. Second, in addition to the two distortions de-
scribed above, the de facto fixed nominal exchange rate combined with sticky
prices induces an additional distortion into the economy, namely an intrinsic
inertia in the terms of trade (Benigno, 2004; Pappa, 2004).14 This causes an
inefficient dispersion of aggregate output across the two countries.
Given that there are as many policy instruments as distortions under the FX
regime but less policy instruments than distortions under the MU regime, mone-
tary policy is more potent under the FX regime, which is shown clearly in Figure
5.1. The “leverage” of monetary policy is higher under the FX regime than un-
der the MU regime in the sense that a given increase in the aggressiveness of
monetary policy towards inflation (measured by φpi) leads to a larger reduction
in the variance of each welfare-relevant variable. In fact, under PPI inflation
targeting, monetary policy can reduce the variances of all welfare-relevant vari-
ables to zero (if φpi →∞). This is impossible under the MU regime.15
The limitations of monetary policy under the MU regime apply in particular
with regard to the terms-of-trade gap (Figure 5.1, lower left panel). Monetary
policy has no effect whatsoever on the terms of trade and thus on the terms-
of-trade gap. Since both countries face the same nominal interest rate, any
interest rate adjustment by the common monetary policy has the same initial
effect on both countries. If the degree of price stickiness is identical across
the two countries, such an interest rate adjustment propagates through both
economies in exactly the same way. In these circumstances, the influence of
monetary policy on the terms of trade is zero. If the degree of price stickiness is
not identical across the two countries, the influence of monetary policy on the
terms of trade is not exactly zero, but it is close to zero.
14Intrinsic inertia is defined as follows: Consider a one-off (i.e., non-persistent) productivity
shock in one country. Under the MU regime, several periods are required before the terms of
trade return to the steady state after the shock has vanished. Thus, the terms of trade are
said to be intrinsically persistent or inertial. Under the FX regime, the terms of trade return
to the steady state immediately after the shock has vanished. In this case, the terms of trade
are not intrinsically inertial.
15See Groll (2013) for the analytical proof of the special case where a = 1/2 and θ = 1.
The proof in the case with no restrictions on a and θ is completely analogous.
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5.3.2. Response to output
As shown above, monetary policy is more potent under the FX regime than un-
der the MU regime due to the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate. However,
there is a flipside to this greater potency, which becomes clear when considering
the case where monetary policy responds to output in addition to inflation.16
If monetary policy responds to output in addition to inflation, the two coun-
tries are generally better off under the MU regime (Figure 5.2, upper left panel).
Moreover, the welfare gain of the MU regime relative to the FX regime increases
with the strength of the response to output (measured by φY ). Beyond a certain
value for φY , all welfare-relevant variables are more stable under the MU regime
(Figure 5.2, upper right, lower left, and lower right panel). All of this holds irre-
spective of whether monetary policy targets PPI or CPI inflation rates. Under
the FX regime, these two policies are virtually identical (in the figure, the ‘FX
PPI’ lines and the ‘FX CPI’ lines basically coincide). Under the MU regime,
they are identical anyway.
Figure 5.2.: World welfare loss and variances of welfare-relevant variables as
a function of the output coefficient (φY )
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The key to understanding these results is the role played by the nominal ex-
change rate in stabilizing the terms-of-trade gap. Combining equations (5.2.28)
16The basic conclusions of this section also hold if monetary policy responds to the change
in output instead. The corresponding graphs are available upon request.
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to (5.2.30) and focusing on productivity shocks in country H yields the follow-
ing relationship between the efficient terms of trade T˜ fbt and the productivity
shock ζˆY,t:
T˜ fbt =
ρη
4a(1− a)ρ(1 + ηθ) + (ρ+ η)(2a− 1)2 ζˆY,t. (5.3.1)
The term in front of the productivity shock is unambiguously positive. Accord-
ingly, the terms of trade would increase in response to a positive productivity
shock in country H if prices were perfectly flexible. However, because prices are
sticky, the increase in the terms of trade is actually smaller. In these circum-
stances, an increase in the nominal exchange rate would help to close the gap
between the actual response of the terms of trade and its efficient counterpart,
thereby stabilizing the terms-of-trade gap and reducing the welfare loss. But
whether the nominal exchange rate stabilizes or destabilizes the terms-of-trade
gap depends crucially on the conduct of monetary policy and, in particular,
on whether and how strongly monetary policy responds to output. This is be-
cause the nominal exchange rate is linked directly via the uncovered interest
parity condition (5.2.3) to the interest rates governed by monetary policy in
each country.17
If monetary policy does not respond to output (φY = 0), the impact response
of the nominal exchange rate to a positive productivity shock in country H is
positive, i.e., country H’s currency depreciates (Figure 5.3, dashed line).18 Thus,
the nominal exchange rate pushes the sticky-price terms of trade in the same
direction as the efficient terms of trade, thereby stabilizing the terms-of-trade
gap to some extent. This holds under both PPI and CPI inflation targeting.19
However, as monetary policy starts to respond to output and becomes more
aggressive towards output (i.e., φY becomes positive and increases), the impact
response of the nominal exchange rate becomes smaller and it is already negative
for very small values of φY (Figure 5.3, solid and dotted line).20 A negative
17Importantly, this link also exists when asset markets are incomplete. In this case, the
uncovered interest parity condition merely contains an additional term that describes the net
asset positions of countries.
18The degree of price stickiness was set low (α = 0.2) to ensure that the differences in the
impulse responses are clearly visible. The differences for higher degrees of price stickiness are
smaller, but they are qualitatively the same.
19Under CPI inflation targeting, this is sensitive to the degree of trade openness a, which
is analyzed in detail in Section 5.4.
20The threshold value of φY at which the impact response of the nominal exchange rate
becomes negative also depends on other model parameters. Under PPI inflation targeting,
it is feasible to derive the exact analytical expression, i.e., the impact response is negative
if φY > (φpi−1)ρ4a(1−a)ρθ+(2a−1)2 . This expression is obtained in the following way (for details, see
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Figure 5.3.: Impulse response of the change in the nominal exchange rate
(∆Sˆt) to a positive one-off productivity shock in country H for
three different values of the output coefficient (φY ), with α = 0.2.
Left panel: PPI inflation targeting. Right panel: CPI inflation
targeting.
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impact response means that the nominal exchange rate destabilizes the terms-
of-trade gap by pushing the sticky-price terms of trade away from the efficient
terms of trade. As a result, not only the terms-of-trade gap, but also the output
gap and the PPI inflation rate are destabilized, thereby increasing the welfare
loss. In these circumstances, a fixed nominal exchange rate would make the
countries better off because this is neither destabilizing nor stabilizing.
Importantly, the nominal exchange rate only amplifies a detrimental effect
that is already present, but it does not cause the detrimental effect. In a closed
economy, a response of monetary policy to output is also detrimental to welfare
(see, e.g., Gali, 2008, Ch. 4.4). It is not the deviation of output from the
steady state that is welfare-relevant, it is the deviation from the flexible-price
counterpart (i.e., the output gap). For example, a positive productivity shock
in country H induces an increase in output, but a decrease in the output gap,
because the increase in output is lower than the increase in flexible-price output.
Groll, 2013, who presents a completely analogous derivation for a special case of the model).
Derive the coefficient c3 of the recursive law of motion for the reduced system of equations
given by Tˆt = b1Tˆt−1 + c1T˜ fbt , pˆi∗F,t− pˆiH,t = b2Tˆt−1 + c2T˜ fbt , and ∆Sˆt = b3Tˆt−1 + c3T˜ fbt , using
the method of undetermined coefficients. Recall that T˜ fbt is a function of the productivity
shock ζˆY,t, see equation (5.3.1). Then, the impact response of the nominal exchange rate to
the productivity shock is given by the coefficient c3, which is negative if φY is larger than the
expression given above. This procedure involves the solution of a full quadratic equation, but
applying the same procedure under CPI inflation targeting requires the solution of a full cubic
equation. This derivation is too cumbersome and its solution is too complex to be useful,
which is why I chose a numerical approach.
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A welfare-oriented response of monetary policy would require a reduction in the
interest rate due to the negative output gap. Instead, monetary policy raises
the interest rate due to the rise in output. This is detrimental to welfare.
For these reasons, a response of monetary policy to output is detrimental
under both the FX regime and the MU regime (in Figure 5.2, the welfare loss
increases in φY under both regimes). However, and this is of the utmost impor-
tance, the detrimental effect is larger under the FX regime due to amplification
by the nominal exchange rate. The same “bad” policy is more harmful under
the FX regime. As described in the previous section, monetary policy is more
potent under the FX regime than under the MU regime in terms of macroeco-
nomic stabilization because of the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate. The
flipside of this is that monetary policy can do more harm in terms of macroeco-
nomic stabilization when it is not conducted properly. Essentially, the nominal
exchange rate does not compensate for monetary policy mistakes, it reinforces
them. In this sense, the MU regime provides a protective mechanism against
monetary policy mistakes.
5.3.3. Interest rate smoothing
Finally, whether countries are better off under the MU regime or under the
FX regime also depends on the degree of interest rate smoothing implemented
by monetary policy, which is particularly true under PPI inflation targeting
(Figure 5.4, solid and dashed lines). Starting with very low degrees of interest
rate smoothing (i.e., low values of φR), the two countries are better off under the
MU regime. As the degree of interest rate smoothing increases (i.e., an increase
in φR), the welfare loss decreases faster under the FX regime than under the
MU regime. At some point, the welfare ranking changes and the two countries
are better off under the FX regime.
As described in Section 5.3.1, the MU regime entails the cost of higher in-
stability of both the output gap and the terms-of-trade gap, but the benefit of
higher stability of the PPI inflation rate (except for high values of φR). The
higher stability of the PPI inflation rate under the MU regime is explained as
follows (see Groll, 2013, for details). The nominal exchange rate is fixed under
the MU regime. As a result, the terms of trade exhibit an inertial or history-
dependent behavior, even if monetary policy does not smooth interest rates.
Since the terms of trade are an important determinant of marginal costs, this
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Figure 5.4.: World welfare loss and variances of welfare-relevant variables as
a function of the interest rate smoothing coefficient (φR)
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history dependence has the advantage of stabilizing private-sector expectations
about future PPI inflation, thereby stabilizing actual PPI inflation.21
If monetary policy targets PPI inflation and does not smooth interest rates
under the FX regime, there is no such history dependence. This regime suffers
from a kind of stabilization bias. As a result, PPI inflation is less stable under
the FX regime. However, if monetary policy starts to smooth interest rates,
it induces history dependence into the economy, with the same advantageous
effect on inflation expectations. This effect strengthens as the degree of interest
rate smoothing increases. If the degree of interest rate smoothing is sufficiently
high, PPI inflation is more stable under the FX regime.
Under CPI inflation targeting, the degree of interest rate smoothing does
not have such an important effect on the welfare ranking between the MU and
FX regime (Figure 5.4, solid and dotted lines).22 This is because, like the MU
regime, the FX regime also features history dependence, even if monetary policy
does not smooth interest rates. As a result, engaging in interest rate smoothing,
21The assumptions in Groll (2013) are somewhat more restrictive (a = 1/2 and θ = 1),
but this benefit is also found in the more general model employed in the present study (i.e.,
no restrictions on a and θ).
22Under the baseline calibration, the welfare ranking does not change with the degree of
interest rate smoothing. However, parameter constellations exist where this is the case, e.g.,
if φpi = 1.2 instead of 1.5.
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thereby inducing greater history dependence into the economy, does not change
the relative welfare performance of the FX and MU regimes dramatically.
5.4. Monetary policy and trade openness
The conduct of monetary policy is not only an independent OCA criterion in
itself, as illustrated in Section 5.3, but it can also modify the nature of other
OCA criteria. This is demonstrated in the following using the degree of trade
openness as an example. But first, I briefly summarize how the relationship
between trade openness and the costs and benefits of a monetary union has
been described in previous studies.
5.4.1. Trade openness in OCA theory
The degree of trade openness or trade integration is one of the oldest and most
prominent OCA criteria. Most studies have established a positive link between
trade openness and the likelihood of a monetary union being beneficial. More
precisely, the more open economies are, the smaller are the costs and the larger
are the benefits associated with monetary unification.
McKinnon (1963) first proposed trade openness as an OCA criterion. He
argued that with an increasingly open economy, the effects of exchange rate
fluctuations on consumer prices via import prices become greater, thereby mak-
ing it more difficult for monetary policy to maintain (consumer) price stability.
Thus, the costs of giving up monetary independence decrease with the degree
of trade openness.
One of the main costs attributed to monetary unification is the loss of the
ability to react to asymmetric (i.e., country-specific) shocks via monetary pol-
icy and the nominal exchange rate. However, there are conflicting views on
whether the incidence of country-specific shocks decreases or increases with the
degree of trade openness. This depends on whether trade between countries is
characterized predominantly by intra-industry trade or inter-industry trade. In
the former case, industry-specific shocks affect countries symmetrically, thus an
increase in the degree of trade openness reduces the cost of giving up monetary
independence (see Ch. 6.2 in the ‘One Market, One Money’ report by the Euro-
pean Commission in Emerson et al., 1992). In the latter case, industry-specific
shocks affect countries asymmetrically, thus an increase in the degree of trade
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openness raises the cost of giving up monetary independence (Krugman, 1991,
p. 82).23
The benefits traditionally associated with monetary unification are usually
considered to increase with the degree of trade openness, such as the elimi-
nation of transaction costs when exchanging currencies, the increase in price
transparency across countries, or the elimination of exchange rate risk (e.g., De
Grauwe, 2012, Ch. 3.8). The latter point is also made by Kollmann (2004)
using a New Keynesian DSGE model similar to that employed in the present
study. He concludes that if the nominal exchange rate is subject to shocks, a
monetary union is welfare-improving because the cost of giving up monetary
independence is overcompensated by the benefit of eliminating exchange rate
risk. This benefit increases with the degree of trade openness because exchange
rate shocks are more harmful to macroeconomic stability as economies become
more open.
Another benefit of a monetary union also increases with the degree of trade
openness, as shown by Pappa (2004) using a similar model. Compared to a
flexible exchange rate regime where the monetary authorities do not cooperate
to maximize domestic welfare, forming a monetary union eliminates the possi-
bility of strategic terms-of-trade manipulations. This benefit increases with the
degree of trade openness because terms-of-trade movements have larger effects
on macroeconomic stability as economies become more open.
5.4.2. Monetary policy and the nature of trade openness as
an OCA criterion
The preceding, brief overview shows that OCA theory mainly establishes a
favorable relationship between the degree of trade openness and the costs and
benefits of a monetary union. Next, I show that this relationship is highly
sensitive to the way monetary policy is conducted.
The influence of monetary policy on the nature of the degree of trade open-
ness as an OCA criterion is particularly clear when distinguishing between PPI
inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting. First consider the case of PPI
inflation targeting (Figure 5.5, solid and dashed lines). Two observations are
noteworthy. First, under both the MU and the FX regime, the relationship
between the welfare loss (and each of its components) and the degree of trade
23See De Grauwe (2012, Ch. 2.1) for a more detailed description and assessment of the
“European Commission view” and the “Krugman view.”
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openness is symmetric around a trade-to-GDP ratio of 100 percent (a = 1/2).
Second, the two countries are better off under the FX regime if they are either
relatively closed (a close to one) or very open to trade (a close to zero), but
better off under the MU regime for intermediate values. Thus, the likelihood of
the MU regime being beneficial increases initially and then decreases with the
degree of trade openness.
Figure 5.5.: World welfare loss and variances of welfare-relevant variables as
a function of the degree of trade openness (a)
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The relationship between trade openness and the welfare ranking between
the MU and FX regime changes considerably if monetary policy targets CPI
inflation rates instead of PPI inflation rates (Figure 5.5, solid and dotted lines).
First, the relationship between the welfare loss (and each of its components)
and the degree of trade openness is no longer symmetric under the FX regime.24
Second, the two countries are better off under the FX regime for trade-to-GDP
ratios between 0 and 100 percent (1/2 < a ≤ 1) and better off under the
MU regime for ratios between 100 and 200 percent (0 ≤ a < 1/2). Thus, the
likelihood of the MU regime being beneficial increases with the degree of trade
openness.
24Recall that there is no difference between PPI and CPI inflation targeting under the MU
regime.
104
Chapter 5. Monetary Policy as an OCA Criterion
Again, the key to understanding these results is the role played by the nom-
inal exchange rate in stabilizing the terms-of-trade gap. Consider a positive
productivity shock in country H. Recall that the efficient terms of trade un-
ambiguously increase on impact (see equation 5.3.1), thus an increase in the
nominal exchange rate would help to stabilize the terms-of-trade gap, thereby
reducing the welfare loss. But whether the nominal exchange rate stabilizes or
destabilizes the terms-of-trade gap depends crucially on the conduct of mone-
tary policy and, in particular, on whether monetary policy targets PPI or CPI
inflation rates.
Under PPI inflation targeting, the impact response of the nominal exchange
rate is positive irrespective of the degree of trade openness, i.e., country H’s
currency depreciates (Figure 5.6, left panel).25 Thus, the nominal exchange
rate pushes the sticky-price terms of trade in the same direction as the efficient
terms of trade, thereby stabilizing the terms-of-trade gap to some extent. Note
that the response of the nominal exchange rate is identical for a = 0.25 and
a = 0.75, which explains the symmetric patterns visible in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.6.: Impulse response of the change in the nominal exchange rate
(∆Sˆt) to a positive one-off productivity shock in country H for
three different degrees of trade openness (a), with α = 0.2. Left
panel: PPI inflation targeting. Right panel: CPI inflation target-
ing.
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By contrast, under CPI inflation targeting, the impact response of the nom-
inal exchange rate is positive if the two countries have a trade-to-GDP ratio
25The degree of price stickiness was set low (α = 0.2) to ensure that the differences in the
impulse responses are clearly visible. The differences are smaller for higher degrees of price
stickiness, but they are qualitatively the same.
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below 100 percent (a > 1/2), but negative if it is above 100 percent (a < 1/2)
(Figure 5.6, right panel). Thus, the nominal exchange rate helps to stabilize
the terms-of-trade gap only in the first case. In the latter case, the nomi-
nal exchange rate actually destabilizes the terms-of-trade gap by pushing the
sticky-price terms of trade away from the efficient terms of trade.
This is robust with respect to the other deep parameters of the economy
(except with respect to the interest rate rule coefficients, see Section 5.3).26 To
see this, insert the country-specific interest rate rules (5.2.14) and (5.2.15) with
φY = 0 and φR = 0 together with the definitions of the CPI inflation rates
(5.2.10) and (5.2.11) and the terms-of-trade identity (5.2.9) into the uncovered
interest parity condition (5.2.3) to obtain
∆Sˆt = (2a− 1)∆Tˆt + 1
φpi
Et∆Sˆt+1. (5.4.1)
Solving forward yields
∆Sˆt = (2a− 1)Et
∞∑
k=0
(
1
φpi
)k
∆Tˆt+k. (5.4.2)
Accordingly, the current change in the nominal exchange rate depends on the
discounted sum of current and expected future changes in the terms of trade.
Importantly, this relationship is unambiguously positive if a > 1/2, but negative
if a < 1/2.
Under PPI inflation targeting, the analogous equations are given by
∆Sˆt = ∆Tˆt +
1
φpi
Et∆Sˆt+1 (5.4.3)
and
∆Sˆt = Et
∞∑
k=0
(
1
φpi
)k
∆Tˆt+k. (5.4.4)
In contrast to the PPI inflation targeting case, the relationship between the
current change in the nominal exchange rate and the discounted sum of current
26In particular, it does not make a difference whether ρθ is smaller than, equal to, or larger
than 1, although this condition has important macroeconomic implications. For example, it
determines whether the cross-country correlation of output is positive, zero, or negative (see,
e.g., Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc, 2011, for details). Also, if it is zero (ρθ = 1), the terms-of-
trade gap vanishes from the welfare loss function (5.2.31).
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and expected future changes in the terms of trade is always positive, regardless
of the degree of trade openness a.27
The nominal exchange rate can be destabilizing under CPI inflation targeting
for the following reason. If the trade-to-GDP ratio is above 100 percent (a <
1/2), consumer prices in one country are determined mainly by producer prices
in the other country because consumers consume more imported goods than
home-produced goods. If monetary policy targets consumer prices, interest rate
adjustments in one country are triggered mainly by producer price changes in
the other country. This pushes the nominal exchange rate, which depends on the
interest rate differential between the two countries, in the wrong direction, i.e.,
away from the efficient terms of trade. As a result, the welfare-relevant terms-of-
trade gap is destabilized by the nominal exchange rate. In these circumstances,
a fixed nominal exchange rate would make the countries better off because this
is neither destabilizing nor stabilizing. For this reason, the countries are better
off under the MU regime for a < 1/2.
In the special case of a trade-to-GDP ratio of exactly 100 percent (a = 1/2),
the two countries are indifferent in terms of welfare between the FX and the MU
regime under CPI inflation targeting. Ultimately, this is because the nominal
exchange rate is constant under both regimes.28 Under the MU regime, the
nominal exchange rate is fixed by construction. Under the FX regime, it is
fixed by coincidence. That is, by targeting CPI inflation rates, the two countries
unintentionally implement a symmetric fixed exchange rate regime.29 This is
because consumer price changes and thus interest rate adjustments are identical
in the two countries.
As mentioned above, the nominal exchange rate stabilizes the terms-of-trade
gap under PPI inflation targeting regardless of the degree of trade openness.
Hence, one would expect that this would always make the FX regime superior to
the MU regime, where the nominal exchange rate is fixed. However, as is shown
in Figure 5.5, higher instability of the terms-of-trade gap (and the output gap)
may be outweighed by higher stability of the PPI inflation rate. The reason why
the PPI inflation rate may be more stable under the MU regime was explained
briefly in Section 5.3.3 and is explained in detail in Groll (2013). In short,
27Note that equation (5.4.2) and equation (5.4.4) are equivalent if a = 1. In this case,
there is no difference between PPI and CPI inflation targeting. This is because the consumer
price index equals the producer price index if a = 1, see equations (5.2.10) and (5.2.11).
28According to equation (5.4.2), ∆Sˆt = 0 if a = 1/2.
29Note that an asymmetric fixed exchange rate regime (i.e., one country pegs its currency
to the other country’s currency) is generally not equivalent to a monetary union regime.
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because the nominal exchange rate is fixed under the MU regime, the terms
of trade exhibit an inertial or history-dependent behavior. Since the terms of
trade are an important determinant of marginal costs, this history dependence
has the advantage of stabilizing private-sector expectations about future PPI
inflation, thereby stabilizing actual PPI inflation.
5.5. Conclusion
The main point of this study is that monetary policy is one of the most impor-
tant OCA criteria. That is, whether countries benefit from forming a monetary
union depends critically on the way monetary policy is conducted. This point
has not yet been emphasized sufficiently in previous OCA studies, if at all.
In this study, I demonstrated systematically how and why different types of
rule-based interest rate policies lead to different welfare rankings between a
monetary union and a flexible exchange rate regime.
In general, when countries are unable or unwilling to implement monetary
policy optimally, for whatever reason, they are likely to benefit from forming a
monetary union. This is especially true when countries tend to make monetary
policy mistakes. In all these circumstances, forming a monetary union entails
the benefit of higher macroeconomic stability, particularly inflation stability.
This study only presented results based on productivity shocks and contem-
poraneous interest rate rules, but all of these conclusions are still valid under
consumption preference shocks and cost-push shocks, as well as under backward-
looking and forward-looking interest rate rules.
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C. Appendix
C.1. Flexible exchange rate regime
This appendix contains the full derivation of the model under the flexible ex-
change rate regime (based on Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc, 2011). The world,
which consists of two countries labeled H and F , is populated by a continuum
of agents on the interval [0, 1]. The population on the segment [0, n) lives in
country H, the population on the segment [n, 1] lives in country F . Thus, n
measures the population size as a fraction of world population. An agent is both
consumer and producer. He produces a single differentiated good and consumes
all the goods produced in both countries.
Consumer problem
Agent j in country H derives positive utility from consumption Cj and negative
utility from producing the differentiated good y(h). The present discounted
value of lifetime utility U j is given by30
U j = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
ζC,tCjt 1−ρ − 11− ρ − ζ−ηY,t yt(h)
1+η
1 + η
 . (C.1)
E denotes the expectations operator, β the discount factor, ρ the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and η the inverse of the
elasticity of producing the differentiated good.31 ζY,t and ζC,t denote shocks to
productivity and to preferences in consumption, respectively. These shocks are
common to all agents living in country H.
The agent consumes both a bundle of differentiated goods from countryH and
from country F according to the following Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution
(CES) aggregator:
Cjt =
[
a
1
θCjH,t
θ−1
θ + (1− a) 1θCjF,t
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
, (C.2)
30In Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2011), the agent derives utility also from the liquidity
services of holding money. I abstract from money in the utility function, since monetary
policy is conducted via interest rate rules.
31The parameter η is equivalent to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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where the bundles of differentiated goods are given by aggregators according to
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):
CjH,t =
[( 1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
0
cjt(h)
σ−1
σ dh
] σ
σ−1
(C.3)
CjF,t =
[( 1
1− n
) 1
σ
∫ 1
n
cjt(f)
σ−1
σ df
] σ
σ−1
.
These preferences imply (1) that the elasticity of substitution between differen-
tiated goods cjt from one country is σ, which is assumed to be greater than one
and equal across countries, (2) that the elasticity of substitution between the
bundles of goods from the two countries CH,t and CF,t is θ, which is assumed
to be greater than zero and equal across countries, and (3) that the steady-
state share of imported goods in overall consumption expenditures is 1− a. If
a > 1/2, the agent consumes more goods from the country the agent lives in
than from the other country, i.e., the agent has a home bias in consumption.
This home bias is assumed to be symmetric across countries. Thus, the CES
aggregator for an agent j living in country F is given by
Cjt
∗ =
[
(1− a) 1θCj∗H,t
θ−1
θ + a 1θCj
∗
F,t
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
. (C.4)
Accordingly, the consumer price index (CPI) in country H expressed in coun-
try H’s currency is given by
Pt =
[
aPH,t
1−θ + (1− a)PF,t1−θ
] 1
1−θ , (C.5)
where the producer price indices (PPI) for the bundles of differentiated goods
expressed in country H’s currency are defined by
PH,t =
[ 1
n
∫ n
0
pt(h)1−σdh
] 1
1−σ
(C.6)
PF,t =
[ 1
1− n
∫ 1
n
pt(f)1−σdf
] 1
1−σ
.
In their role as producers, agents charge one price for their good irrespective
of whether the good is sold in their country or is exported to the other country
(no price discrimination), setting the price in their country’s currency (producer
currency pricing). Furthermore, exporting does not entail transportation costs.
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These assumptions imply that the law of one price holds, i.e., a single differ-
entiated good has the same price in both countries if expressed in the same
currency, and that exchange rate pass-through is complete:
pt(h) = Stp∗t (h), pt(f) = Stp∗t (f), (C.7)
where pt(h) denotes the price of a differentiated good y(h) produced in country
H denominated in country H’s currency, p∗t (h) denotes the price of the same
good y(h) denominated in country F ’s currency, pt(f) denotes the price of
a differentiated good y(f) produced in country F denominated in country H’s
currency, p∗t (f) denotes the price of the same good y(f) denominated in country
F ’s currency, and St is the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of country
F ’s currency in terms of country H’s currency. Given equations (C.6), it is
straightforward to show that the law of one price for each differentiated good
translates into the law of one price for each bundle of goods:
PH,t = StP ∗H,t, PF,t = StP ∗F,t. (C.8)
The CPI in country F expressed in country F ’s currency is given by
P ∗t =
[
(1− a)P ∗H,t1−θ + aP ∗F,t1−θ
] 1
1−θ . (C.9)
In general, the law of one price does not translate into purchasing power parity.
Thus, the real exchange rate, defined as the ratio of country-specific consumer
prices
Qt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
, (C.10)
adjusts in response to changing economic conditions. Purchasing power parity
(Qt = 1) only holds if the consumption baskets are identical across countries
(a = 1/2).
Another international relative price of interest are the terms of trade, defined
from the perspective of country H as the ratio of the price of imported goods
to the price of exported goods:
Tt =
StP
∗
F,t
PH,t
. (C.11)
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Agent j in country H takes three decisions with respect to his consumption
choices. First, he decides on the overall level of consumption Cjt .32 Second,
given Cjt the agent optimally allocates expenditures between the bundles of
differentiated goods CjH,t and C
j
F,t by minimizing total expenditure PtC
j
t subject
to the CES aggregator (C.2). As a result, demand for these bundles is given by
CjH,t = a
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Cjt , C
j
F,t = (1− a)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Cjt . (C.12)
Third, given CjH,t and C
j
F,t the agent optimally allocates expenditures between
the differentiated goods by minimizing PH,tCjH,t and PF,tC
j
F,t subject to equa-
tions (C.3). This yields
cjt(h) =
1
n
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ
CjH,t, c
j
t(f) =
1
1− n
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ
CjF,t. (C.13)
Combining (C.12) and (C.13) yields
cjt(h) =
a
n
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ (
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Cjt (C.14)
cjt(f) =
1− a
1− n
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ (
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Cjt .
Analogously, demand equations for an agent j in country F are given by
cjt
∗(h) = 1− a
n
(
p∗t (h)
P ∗H,t
)−σ (P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−θ
Cjt
∗ (C.15)
cjt
∗(f) = a1− n
(
p∗t (f)
P ∗F,t
)−σ (P ∗F,t
P ∗t
)−θ
Cjt
∗
.
Market clearing for the differentiated goods yt(h) and yt(f) requires
yt(h) =
∫ n
0
cjt(h)dj +
∫ 1
n
cjt
∗(h)dj (C.16)
yt(f) =
∫ n
0
cjt(f)dj +
∫ 1
n
cjt
∗(f)dj.
32As shown below, Cjt is determined by the usual Euler consumption equation.
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Using equations (C.14) and (C.15), world demand for the differentiated goods
can be expressed as
yt(h) =
1
n
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−σ (
PH,t
Pt
)−θ [
aCt + (1− a)QθtC∗t
]
(C.17)
yt(f) =
1
1− n
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−σ (
PF,t
Pt
)−θ [
(1− a)Ct + aQθtC∗t
]
,
where Ct ≡ ∫ n0 Cjt dj and C∗t ≡ ∫ 1n Cjt ∗dj.
Similar to (C.3), aggregate output in the two countries can be expressed as
YH,t =
[( 1
n
) 1
σ
∫ n
0
yt(h)
σ−1
σ dh
] σ
σ−1
(C.18)
YF,t =
[( 1
1− n
) 1
σ
∫ 1
n
yt(f)
σ−1
σ df
] σ
σ−1
.
Inserting equations (C.17) into the previous equations finally yields aggregate
demand
YH,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ [
aCt + (1− a)QθtC∗t
]
(C.19)
YF,t =
(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ [
(1− a)Ct + aQθtC∗t
]
.
Asset markets are assumed to be complete within and across countries. Agents
can insure against all possible states of nature by holding a portfolio of state-
contingent, one-period securities whose real value (denominated in units of the
consumption-based price index) is denoted by BH,jt and whose vector of prices
is denoted by qHt . In addition, agents can trade in a non-contingent, one-period
bond whose nominal value (denominated in country H’s currency) is denoted
by Bjt and whose nominal interest rate is denoted by Rt. The intertemporal
budget constraint of agent j in country H is then given by
Cjt + qHt B
H,j
t +
Bjt
Pt(1 +Rt)
= BH,jt−1 +
Bjt−1
Pt
+ (1− τHt )
pt(h)yt(h)
Pt
, (C.20)
The agent’s income stems also from sales revenues pt(h)yt(h) net of a propor-
tional, country-specific tax τHt .33
33The tax will turn out to be a subsidy to exactly offset the distortion caused by monop-
olistic competition.
113
Chapter 5. Monetary Policy as an OCA Criterion
All contingent securities and non-contingent bonds are assumed to be in zero
supply in the initial period, so BH,j0 = Bj0 = 0 for all j. Together with the
facts that, within countries, agents have identical preferences and that asset
markets are complete, this implies perfect risk sharing of consumption within
each country. Therefore, it is possible to analyze the consumer problem from
the viewpoint of the representative agent of country H and country F .
The representative agent in country H maximizes his lifetime utility (C.1)
subject to the budget constraint (C.20). By combining the resulting first order
conditions with respect to consumption and bond holdings, the usual Euler
consumption equation is then given by
UC(Ct, ζC,t) = (1 +Rt)βEt
{
UC(Ct+1, ζC,t+1)
Pt
Pt+1
}
. (C.21)
The Euler consumption equation for the representative agent in country F is
obtained analogously and given by
UC(C∗t , ζ∗C,t) = (1 +R∗t )βEt
{
UC(C∗t+1, ζ∗C,t+1)
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
}
. (C.22)
Complete asset markets across countries leads to price equalization in the
state-contingent securities (expressed in country H’s currency), implying the
following risk sharing condition:
β
UC(Ct+1, ζC,t+1)
UC(Ct, ζC,t)
Pt
Pt+1
= β
UC(C∗t+1, ζ∗C,t+1)
UC(C∗t , ζ∗C,t)
StP
∗
t
St+1P ∗t+1
(C.23)
Inserting the country-specific Euler consumption equations yields the uncovered
interest parity condition, according to which the expected change in the nominal
exchange rate corresponds to the ratio of the country-specific interest rates:
Et∆St+1 =
1 +Rt
1 +R∗t
. (C.24)
Assuming net foreign asset positions to be initially symmetric and applying
the definition of the real exchange rate (C.10), the risk sharing condition takes
the following form:
Qt =
(
C∗t
Ct
)−ρ ζ∗C,t
ζC,t
. (C.25)
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Producer problem
In their role as producers, agents act in an environment of monopolistic com-
petition, in which they dispose of some degree of market power. Furthermore,
prices are sticky in the sense that the agent is able to change his price in a given
period with a fixed probability, as in Calvo (1983). The probability of being
able to change the price may differ across countries and is given by 1 − αi for
i = H,F .
Agent j in country H maximizes expected, discounted profits by choosing the
price p˜t(h) taking into account that demand depends on the chosen price and
that the price may remain unchanged for some periods. Formally, the agent
maximizes
Et
∞∑
k=0
(αHβ)k
[
λt+k(1− τHt )p˜t(h)y˜t,t+k(h)− V (y˜t,t+k(h), ζY,t+k)
]
(C.26)
subject to the demand function
y˜t,t+k(h) =
1
n
(
p˜t(h)
PH,t+k
)−σ (
PH,t+k
Pt+k
)−θ [
aCt+k + (1− a)Qθt+kC∗t+k
]
(C.27)
where y˜t,t+k(h) denotes total demand of good h at time t+ k if the price p˜t(h)
prevails. Profits are expressed in utility units. Therefore, nominal sales rev-
enues net of taxes (1 − τHt )p˜t(h)y˜t,t+k(h) are converted into utility units using
the marginal utility of nominal revenues λt+k = UC(Ct+k,ζC,t+k)Pt+k . The cost of
production expressed in utility units is given by the function V = ζ−ηY,t
yt(h)1+η
1+η .
The first order condition yields the optimal price
p˜t(h) =
σ
(σ − 1)(1− τHt )
Et
∑∞
k=0(αHβ)kVy(y˜t,t+k(h), ζY,t+k)y˜t,t+k(h)
Et
∑∞
k=0(αHβ)kλt+ky˜t,t+k(h)
, (C.28)
where Vy denotes the derivative of function V with respect to output y˜(h). All
agents that live in the same country and are able to reset their price in a certain
period will set the same price, since they share identical preferences (function
V ) and face the same demand curves, which depend only on aggregate variables
such as PH , P , P ∗, S, C and C∗, and the common elasticities of substitution σ
and θ. Hence, in a given period, a fraction 1 − αi of agents will set the same
optimal price, while for a fraction αi of agents the price from the previous period
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remains effective:
PH,t = [αHP 1−σH,t−1 + (1− αH)p˜t(h)1−σ]
1
1−σ (C.29)
P ∗F,t = [αFP ∗1−σF,t−1 + (1− αF )p˜∗t (f)1−σ]
1
1−σ .
When prices are flexible, the optimal-price equation (C.28) for country H
simplifies to
PH,t
Pt
= σ(σ − 1)(1− τHt )
Vy(yt(h), ζY,t)
UC(Ct, ζC,t)
, (C.30)
and for country F to
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
= σ(σ − 1)(1− τFt )
Vy(yt(f), ζ∗Y,t)
UC(C∗t , ζ∗C,t)
. (C.31)
Moreover, variations in the marginal disutility of production of one country
relative to the other country are reflected in relative variations in the terms of
trade and the real exchange rate. Dividing the previous two equations yields
Tt
Qt
= 1− τ
H
t
1− τFt
Vy(yt(f), ζ∗Y,t)
Vy(yt(h), ζY,t)
. (C.32)
The markup that agents in country i = H,F are able to charge is defined as
µit ≡
σ
(σ − 1)(1− τ it )
. (C.33)
Log-linearization
Deviations of the logarithm of a variable Xt from its steady state are denoted
by Xˆt if prices are sticky and by X˜fbt if prices are flexible and markups are
neutralized (efficient allocation).
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Sticky-price equilibrium Under sticky prices, the system of equations is given
by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(
Rˆt − Etpit+1 + EtζˆC,t+1 − ζˆC,t
)
(C.34)
Qˆt = ρ
(
Cˆt − Cˆ∗t
)
+
(
ζˆ∗C,t − ζˆC,t
)
(C.35)
Et∆Sˆt+1 = Rˆt − Rˆ∗t (C.36)
Qˆt = (2a− 1)Tˆt (C.37)
YˆH,t = 2a(1− a)θTˆt + aCˆt + (1− a)Cˆ∗t (C.38)
YˆF,t = −2a(1− a)θTˆt + (1− a)Cˆt + aCˆ∗t (C.39)
piH,t = kHY
(
YˆH,t − Y˜ fbH,t
)
− 2a(1− a)kHT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kHµ µˆHt + βEtpiH,t+1
(C.40)
pi∗F,t = kFY
(
YˆF,t − Y˜ fbF,t
)
+ 2a(1− a)kFT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kFµ µˆFt + βEtpi∗F,t+1 (C.41)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + pi∗F,t − piH,t + ∆Sˆt (C.42)
pit = apiH,t + (1− a)(pi∗F,t + ∆Sˆt) (C.43)
pi∗t = (1− a)(piH,t −∆Sˆt) + api∗F,t. (C.44)
Equation (C.34) is the log-linear approximation of the Euler consumption
equation (C.21), where pit = ln(Pt/Pt−1). Equation (C.35) is the log-linear
approximation of the risk sharing condition (C.25), and equation (C.36) is the
log-linear approximation of the uncovered interest parity condition (C.24).34
Equation (C.37) describes the link between the real exchange rate and the terms
of trade and is obtained by combining the log-linearized definition of the real
exchange rate (C.10) with the log-linearized expressions for the country-specific
CPI’s (C.5) and (C.9), applying the law of one price. Equations (C.38) and
(C.39) are obtained by log-linearizing the aggregate demand equations (C.19),
using equation (C.37) to eliminate the real exchange rate.
Equations (C.40) and (C.41) represent the New Keynesian Phillips curves for
country H and country F respectively, where piH,t = ln(PH,t/PH,t−1) and pi∗F,t =
ln(P ∗F,t/P ∗F,t−1). They are derived by combining the log-linear approximation of
the optimal price (C.28) with the log-linear approximation of (C.29) for each
country separately. The parameters in front of the output gap
(
Yˆi,t − Y˜ fbi,t
)
, the
terms-of-trade gap
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
, and the markup µˆit are defined as follows (for
34Alternatively, the model could be specified by including both country-specific Euler con-
sumption equations next to the risk sharing condition, while omitting the uncovered interest
parity condition.
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i = H,F ):
kiY =
(1− αiβ)(1− αi)
αi
ρ+ η
1 + ση (C.45)
kiT =
(1− αiβ)(1− αi)
αi
ρθ − 1
1 + ση (C.46)
kiµ =
(1− αiβ)(1− αi)
αi
1
1 + ση . (C.47)
Equation (C.42) is the log-linear approximation of the terms of trade (C.11),
expressed in first differences. Equations (C.43) and (C.44) are the log-linear
approximations of the country-specific CPI’s (C.5) and (C.9), applying the law
of one price and expressed in first differences.
The model is closed by a Taylor-type interest rate rule for each country,
according to which monetary policy responds to inflation and output with co-
efficients φpi and φY and engages in interest rate smoothing with coefficient
φR. Monetary policy responds either to PPI inflation or to CPI inflation. If
monetary policy responds to PPI inflation, the interest rate rules are given by
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipiH,t + φY YˆH,t) (C.48)
Rˆ∗t = φRRˆ∗t−1 + (1− φR)(φpipi∗F,t + φY YˆF,t). (C.49)
If monetary policy responds to CPI inflation, the interest rate rules are given
by
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipit + φY YˆH,t) (C.50)
Rˆ∗t = φRRˆ∗t−1 + (1− φR)(φpipi∗t + φY YˆF,t). (C.51)
Efficient allocation The first-best (fb) or efficient allocation describes the
equilibrium in which prices are fully flexible and in which markups are neutral-
ized at all times with an appropriate subsidy (µit = 0). This efficient allocation
provides a useful benchmark in order to assess the welfare implications of the
two international monetary regimes.
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Accordingly, efficient output in each country is given by
(ρ+ η)Y˜ fbH,t =2a(1− a)(ρθ − 1)T˜ fbt (C.52)
− (1− a)
(
ζˆC,t − ζˆ∗C,t
)
+ ζˆC,t + ηζˆY,t
(ρ+ η)Y˜ fbF,t =− 2a(1− a)(ρθ − 1)T˜ fbt
+ (1− a)
(
ζˆC,t − ζˆ∗C,t
)
+ ζˆ∗C,t + ηζˆ∗Y,t.
The efficient terms of trade can be written as
[4a(1− a)ρθ + (2a− 1)2]T˜ fbt = ρ
(
Y˜ fbH,t − Y˜ fbF,t
)
− (2a− 1)
(
ζˆC,t − ζˆ∗C,t
)
. (C.53)
The first equation is obtained by combining the risk sharing condition (C.35),
equation (C.37), and the aggregate demand equation (C.38), all of which hold
under flexible prices as well, with the log-linear approximation of the optimal-
price equation (C.30). The second equation is derived completely analogously.
The third equation is derived by subtracting the country-specific aggregate de-
mand equations (C.38) and (C.39) from each other and by using the risk sharing
condition (C.35) and equation (C.37) to eliminate country-specific consumption
and the real exchange rate.
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C.2. Monetary union regime
The main difference of the monetary union regime compared to the flexible
exchange rate regime, of course, is that the two countries share one currency
and that the common monetary policy sets one union-wide nominal interest
rate. Notwithstanding, the model structure is to a large extent identical (see,
e.g., Benigno, 2004).
Under flexible prices, monetary policy is neutral, so that real variables are
only driven by fundamental shocks. Thus, the efficient allocation is indepen-
dent of the international monetary regime. Therefore, the behavior of efficient
output and the efficient terms of trade under the monetary union regime is also
described by equations (C.52) and (C.53).
Under sticky prices, the system of equations is given by
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt +
1
ρ
(
RˆMUt − Etpit+1 + EtζˆC,t+1 − ζˆC,t
)
(C.54)
Qˆt = ρ
(
Cˆt − Cˆ∗t
)
+
(
ζˆ∗C,t − ζˆC,t
)
(C.55)
Qˆt = (2a− 1)Tˆt (C.56)
YˆH,t = 2a(1− a)θTˆt + aCˆt + (1− a)Cˆ∗t (C.57)
YˆF,t = −2a(1− a)θTˆt + (1− a)Cˆt + aCˆ∗t (C.58)
piH,t = kHY
(
YˆH,t − Y˜ fbH,t
)
− 2a(1− a)kHT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kHµ µˆHt + βEtpiH,t+1
(C.59)
pi∗F,t = kFY
(
YˆF,t − Y˜ fbF,t
)
+ 2a(1− a)kFT
(
Tˆt − T˜ fbt
)
+ kFµ µˆFt + βEtpi∗F,t+1 (C.60)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + pi∗F,t − piH,t (C.61)
pit = apiH,t + (1− a)pi∗F,t (C.62)
pi∗t = (1− a)piH,t + api∗F,t. (C.63)
The Euler consumption equation (C.54) differs from the one under the flexi-
ble exchange rate regime only in that the nominal interest rate is given by the
union-wide interest rate RˆMUt . Nonetheless, real interest rates RˆMUt −Etpit+1 are
generally country-specific, since CPI inflation rates usually differ across coun-
tries. Since the two countries form a monetary union, the uncovered interest
parity condition is obsolete and the nominal exchange rate disappears from all
relevant equations.
The model is closed by a Taylor-type interest rate rule, according to which the
common monetary policy responds to union-wide inflation (average of country-
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specific inflation) and union-wide output (average of country-specific output)
with coefficients φpi and φY and engages in interest rate smoothing with coeffi-
cient φR. If monetary policy responds to PPI inflation, the interest rate rule is
given by
RˆMUt = φRRˆMUt−1 + (1− φR)
(
φpi
piH,t + pi∗F,t
2 + φY
YˆH,t + YˆF,t
2
)
. (C.64)
If monetary policy responds to CPI inflation, the interest rate rule is given by
RˆMUt = φRRˆMUt−1 + (1− φR)
(
φpi
pit + pi∗t
2 + φY
YˆH,t + YˆF,t
2
)
. (C.65)
Using equations (C.62) and (C.63), it is straightforward to show that the average
of CPI inflation rates is equal to the average of PPI inflation rates:
pit + pi∗t
2 =
piH,t + pi∗F,t
2 ≡ pi
MU
t . (C.66)
As a result, the interest rate rule is the same irrespective of whether the common
monetary policy responds to CPI or PPI inflation:
RˆMUt = φRRˆMUt−1 + (1− φR)
(
φpipi
MU
t + φY
YˆH,t + YˆF,t
2
)
. (C.67)
This implies that the behavior of all variables and the resulting welfare losses
are the same irrespective of whether the common monetary policy responds to
CPI or PPI inflation.
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